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ABSTRACT 
 Many firms use mergers and acquisitions as a corporate strategy to increase shareholder 
value. Therefore, understanding such a widely exercised strategy and its implications on 
corporate change would be critical for organizations that wish to pursue this strategy. This study 
provides an in depth review of mergers and acquisitions and introduces best practices for 
managing changes that result from mergers and acquisitions. Next, the concepts are applied to 
two cases of acquisitions in VersaCold, a major provider of refrigerated warehousing and 
distribution services in Canada. Strengths and weaknesses in each case are assessed and 
recommendations are produced for VersaCold‘s future mergers and acquisitions. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 VersaCold, a refrigerated warehousing and distribution company, has grown organically 
and through acquisitions since it was first established in 1946 as BC Ice and Cold Storage 
Company. This paper analyses two cases of VersaCold‘s acquisitions: acquisition of Geneva 
Lakes Cold Storage/Wisconsin Logistics in 2003 and acquisition of P&O Cold Logistics in 
2005.The focus of the analysis is on managing the changes that resulted from these acquisitions.  
 Three change management frameworks are utilized to assess the effectiveness of change 
management in each case. These frameworks are Kurt Lewin‘s model, the ADKAR model and 
the ExperiencePoint‘s model explained in section 3.3. Both case studies received high scores 
under each model which indicate they were managed very well. Two similar aspects are identified 
as the contributors to the success of change management for these cases: First, a strong 
communication program throughout the change. Second, a similar decentralized culture between 
VersaCold and the acquired companies. The analysis shows that both cases received the lowest 
scores in the areas of creating the desire for change and motivating staff. To improve these areas, 
section 6 of this paper offers several recommendations on various monetary and non-monetary 
incentive tools.  
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1. Introduction to Mergers and Acquisitions 
 Many firms use mergers and acquisitions as a corporate strategy to gain competitive 
advantage, synergies and, thus, increase shareholder value. Recent news on Microsoft acquiring 
Skype, and Texas Instruments acquiring National Semiconductors are a few examples that 
substantiate this view. In this chapter, a thorough review of the types and historical trends of 
M&As is provided. Financing options to support M&A are also reviewed. 
1.1 What are M&A? 
 Consolidation of two or more companies is achieved through a merger or acquisition. 
Although the terms merger and acquisition are often used together they have different meanings. 
Acquisition occurs when one company purchases another company. The buyer absorbs the target 
and inserts control over its operation. As a result, the buyer‘s stocks continue to be traded while 
the stocks of the target company cease to exist.  A merger, however, refers to amalgamation of 
two similarly sized companies. The merging companies decide to join forces and operate as a new 
single company rather than being separately run. This is sometimes referred to as merger of the 
equals. New stocks are issued which replace the stocks of the merging firms. 
 In reality, true merger of equals seldom occur. The distribution of assets and power is 
rarely equal among the companies. Consequently an acquirer and acquiree emerge. Although the 
majority of transactions are technically acquisitions in which one company buys another 
company, it is common to see acquisitions being announced as mergers. The reason lies in the 
psychological effects created by acquisitions: Acquisitions may trigger negative mental 
associations in the minds of the employees of acquired firms. Employees generally dislike the 
feeling of being bought out. The executives of the acquired firm, in particular, don‘t favor the 
term since the acquisition makes them in effect ‗middle managers‘. Occasionally, the impact is so 
strong that it impedes the progress of negotiation and reaching a deal. An example is Lucent and 
Alcatel of France, two of the world‘s largest manufacturers of communication products. Merger 
talks were suspended on May 29, 2001 by Henry B. Schacht, chairman of Lucent, as the 
transaction started to get perceived as an acquisition versus a merger. (Hartley, 2011, p. 317). 
Therefore, to mediate such effects, acquisitions are sometimes framed and announced as mergers.  
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1.1.1  Private vs. Public 
 Mergers and acquisitions are categorized into private and public transactions depending 
on the status of the target firm prior to the transaction. If the target company is private, the 
transaction is private. Similarly, if the target company is public, the transaction is classified as 
public.  
 Acquisition is sometimes used as a means for private companies to become public. For 
private companies wishing to access public markets a traditional IPO is a costly and time 
consuming process. Private companies can bypass the IPO process by acquiring a shell of a 
public company in a transaction commonly referred to as reverse takeover or reverse merger.   
1.1.2  Friendly vs. Hostile 
 In another context, M&As are classified into friendly and hostile transactions. Many 
M&As are friendly transactions in which the senior management of the two firms communicate 
and negotiate price along with other terms of the deal. If the target company is public, its 
shareholders are presented with the terms of the deal and their approval is obtained prior to 
closing the deal. For large transactions, shareholder approval of both companies may be required. 
(Gaughan, 2005, p. 4). In hostile deals, the target company is either unaware of the deal or in 
most cases unwilling to be bought out. There could be different reasons why target companies 
avoid being acquired. For instance, the board of directors or shareholders may feel that the deal 
would diminish the value of the company or expose it to danger of going out of business. 
Furthermore, management may prevent the deal due to self interest motives such as saving their 
own jobs. They might fear their positions would be eliminated or replaced in the organizational 
restructure that usually follows an acquisition.  
 When the target company is not participating in M&A negotiations, the hostile acquirer 
may pursue either a tender offer or a proxy approach to gain control of the target firm. A tender 
offer is a publicly advertised open offer to purchase a substantial portion of the target company‘s 
outstanding stocks at a predetermined price for a specific time frame, subject to shareholders 
tendering a fixed number of their shares in that time frame. To attract sellers, the predetermined 
offer price is usually at a significant premium over market price. The intent for the hostile 
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acquirer is to purchase enough shares so that it could have majority of voting shares and hence 
control over the target company.  By reaching directly to shareholders, this process effectively 
bypasses directors and managers of the company. Jarrell (n.d.) argues that tender offers are the 
most powerful instrument for hostile bidders as the threat of a hostile tender offer, in itself, can 
often persuade reluctant target managers to come to the negotiation table. This threat is 
particularly credible when the bidder already owns a significant portion of the target‘s stocks and 
demonstrates financial capability to finance a hostile tender offer.  
 Alternatively, the hostile acquirer might choose to work rather in ‗disguise‘. The buyer or 
a team of buyers could gradually purchase enough shares to gain majority control over the target 
company. This tactic is referred to as a creeping tender offer and could be risky because once the 
target company suspects a hostile takeover it can take steps to prevent it by creating a poison pill 
or other measures. 
 One doesn‘t need to buy a majority of shares to have control over the target company. An 
alternate approach in a hostile takeover is to convince shareholders to vote for a new team of 
directors who would support the acquisition. The shareholders are asked to appoint the buyers in 
a ‗proxy‘ as their representatives to vote.  This is an effective method and has gained popularity 
in recent years because it circumvents the various defense mechanisms that companies implement 
to prevent purchase of a controlling interest.  
1.1.3  Financing Alternatives 
 There are three widely used arrangements to finance a merger & acquisition: cash, stocks 
or a combination of both. In cash based transactions, as the name implies, the only consideration 
is cash; shares of the target company are traded for cash. In stock based transactions, the shares of 
the target company are exchanged with a certain number of the shares of the bidding company. 
The bidding company generally issues new shares to finance the transaction; however, 
occasionally it may combine its own shares with third party shares in an offer package.  The third 
common method is a combination of cash and stock. Having a portion of the compensation as 
stocks is particularly beneficial when the buyer intends to keep the seller engaged and motivated 
towards the success of the combined companies. There are other financing alternatives such as 
debt securities or preferred shares that are less frequently used. 
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 Which method to use depends on a variety of micro and macroeconomic considerations 
and deal structures. Cash position, access to credit, risks and costs associated with obtaining 
credit play important roles in the ability of the acquirer to finance a cash transaction. Similarly, 
the company needs to assess the dilutive effect of issuing stocks and the impact on its earnings 
per share (EPS) before engaging in a stock based transaction.  Another major consideration is the 
different tax consequences of each method. Ultimately, on one hand, the buyer has to analyze its 
own financial status and on the other hand the financial status of the combined companies to 
determine optimal debt vs. equity financing structure.   
1.2 Merger/Acquisition Types 
 From an economic perspective, mergers may be classified as horizontal, vertical, and 
conglomerate (DePamphilis, 2010, p.19). The classification depends on whether the merging 
firms operate in the same or different industries and also on their relative positions in the value 
chain. Value chain refers to a series of value generating activities. Figure 1-1 shows five generic 
value generating steps that are common to a wide range of firm (Porter, 1985).   
 
Figure 1-1: Value Chain (Porter,1985) 
1.2.1 Horizontal Mergers 
 Horizontal mergers refer to the combination of two firms in the same industry. The 
products or services of the firms are either identical or similar in nature. An example would be the 
takeover of a car manufacturing company by another car manufacturing company.  
 One reason a horizontal merger is pursued is to increase market share and eliminate 
competition. Horizontal mergers can sometimes result in the creation of monopolies. With a large 
market share, the company can increase the price of its products and services which could unduly 
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affect the consumers. As such, some of the larger horizontal mergers are perceived as 
anticompetitive and are blocked by governments.  
 Another reason for horizontal mergers is to achieve economies of scale which lowers the 
production cost per unit for the combined firms (Geddes 2006, p. 104).  Cost savings result from 
a few sources: First, by combining purchases of both firms, the new firm can take advantage of 
reduced purchasing prices for higher volumes. Second, the firm can enjoy cost savings in certain 
areas such as advertising because the same TV or radio ad can now promote both firms. Third, 
duplicate functions and roles can be eliminated to achieve synergies. For instance, back office 
functions such as accounting, payroll, tax, and IT can be consolidated to serve both firms.  
1.2.2 Vertical Mergers 
 From a value chain perspective, a firm might not own operations in each segment of the 
value chain and may choose to acquire such segments in what is called a vertical merger. There 
are two types of vertical mergers: forward merger and backward merger.  In a forward merger, the 
firm purchases one of its downstream value segments such as sales distribution channel and 
brings the company closer to the end consumer. For instance, Boise Cascade, a paper 
manufacturing company, acquired office products distributor, Office Max, in 2003 for $1.1 
billion (DePamphilis, 2010, p.19). In a backward merger, the firm buys one of its upstream value 
segments, usually a supplier, and brings the company closer to the source of supply. For instance, 
Tata Motors, India‘s largest automobile company purchased an 80% stake in Trilix Srl., Turin 
(Italy), a design and engineering company, in 2010 for €1.85 million. (―Tata Motors acquires...‖, 
2010). 
 Vertical mergers have several advantages. One advantage is increased entry barriers for 
potential competitors especially if the incumbent firm can gain exclusive access to a scarce 
resource or distribution channel. Another advantage is improved coordination of supply chain and 
reduced costs in certain areas such as transportation if the merged companies become 
geographically close. Additionally, a vertical merger enables the acquiring firm to access the 
technologies of the acquiree. This would facilitate investments in complementary specialized 
assets that could generate competitive advantage (Teece, 1986). 
 Vertical mergers pose some disadvantages as well. Hill and Jones (2010, p. 298) argue 
that profits of a vertical merger could be diminished due to three factors. First, company-owned 
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suppliers might become inefficient over time especially if the company continues to buy material 
from its own suppliers while third party suppliers can provide the same material at a lower cost. 
Second, in times of rapid technological change, a vertical integration might lock the firm into an 
old, inefficient technology which would erode its competitive advantage over time. Third, in 
cases where the demand for the company‘s core products is unpredictable, scheduling production 
and managing supplies volume throughout the value change become challenging. This would 
result in either shortage or surplus of inventory which are both costly. Another disadvantage of 
the vertical integration is that the firm could get distracted from its core competencies. Imagine a 
manufacturing firm that has acquired a retail distribution chain. Since operating a retail business 
is very different from a manufacturing business, a different set of core competencies would be 
needed. A shift to learn new competencies could be time consuming and could also take away the 
attention from the core competencies.  
1.2.3 Conglomerate Mergers 
 Conglomerate mergers refer to the combination of two or more businesses in largely 
unrelated industries. One example is the acquisition of Marathon Oil by U.S. Steel in the mid-
1980s. Advocates of conglomerate mergers argue that mergers across different industries allow 
for investment diversification and thus sharing of risk. They also provide income smoothing and 
grant protection against seasonality and other business cycles. Another benefit, similar to 
horizontal mergers, is potential savings in shared back office services such as accounting, payroll, 
tax, IT, etc.  
 Despite their popularities in the 1960s and 1970s, conglomerate mergers have since lost 
their appeal. Many people believe that conglomerate mergers destroy shareholder value. Servaes 
(1996, p.1) argues that, even during the 1960s and 1970s, diversified conglomerates were valued 
at a discount compared to single-segment firms. The discount, however, was reduced to zero in 
the 1970s.  
1.3 Trends 
 The last century has seen five merger waves. Geddes (2006, p. 106) identifies the first 
three as a US phenomena while the other two had a global reach.  A merger wave refers to a 
period of a high number of mergers followed by a period of relatively few deals. 
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1.3.1 Merger Wave 1: 1897- 1904 
 The first merger wave occurred in 1897 to 1904, with its peak in 1899 (Table 1-1). 
Following the depression of 1883, this wave affected major mining and manufacturing sectors in 
the United States. Eight industries that were most affected by this wave are Primary metals, Food 
products, Petroleum products, Chemicals, Transportation Equipment, Fabricated metal products, 
Machinery and Bituminous coal (Gaughan, 2005, p.30). The majority of the mergers in this 
period were of the horizontal type (Table 1-2), which resulted in industry consolidation and the 
creation of large monopolies. Some of today‘s large industrial companies originated from this 
first merger wave. Some examples include U.S. Steel, DuPont, Standard Oil and General Electric. 
Table 1-1: Number of Mergers - First Merger Wave (Gaughan, 2005, p.31) 
 
 
Table 1-2: Percentage of Merger Types- First Merger Wave (Gaughan, 2005, p.31) 
 
  
Year
Number of 
Mergers
1897 69
1898 303
1899 1208
1900 340
1901 423
1902 379
1903 142
1904 79
Type of Merger Percentage(%)
Horizontal 78.3
Vertical 12.0
Horizontal & Vertical 9.7
Total 100
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1.3.2 Merger Wave 2: 1916 - 1929 
 The second merger wave occurred in the period of 1916 to 1929. Several industries 
consolidated in this period but the result was often oligopolistic structures in contrast to 
monopolies created in the first merger wave. This was due to the laws passed to prevent 
monopolies.  
 Following the first merger wave, concerns over monopoly power and market abuse 
heightened. The Sherman Act of 1890, passed to limit cartels and monopolies, was proved 
ineffective in preventing monopolies. As a result, the Clayton Act was passed in 1914 to 
supplement antimonopoly provisions of the Sherman Act. The Clayton act outlined specific 
illegal practices, the three-level enforcement system, the exemptions, and the remedial measures. 
Gaughan (2005, p.37) argues that the more stringent antitrust environment resulted in oligopoly 
structures as well as a large number of vertical mergers. In addition, companies from unrelated 
industries merged to create the first large-scale conglomerates.  
 In the period from 1926 to 1930, a total of 4600 mergers occurred. A large portion of 
these transactions took place in five industries: Primary Metals, Petroleum products, Food 
products, Chemicals and Transportation equipment (Gaughan, 2005, P. 38). This merger wave 
was ended by the Wall Street stock market crash of 1929. 
1.3.3 Merger Wave 3: 1965 – 1969 
 The third merger wave occurred from 1965 to 1969. The booming economy triggered a 
large increase in the number of mergers in this period (Table 1-3). Many conglomerates were 
formed across unrelated industries. Some examples of such conglomerates were Ling-Temco-
Vought (LTV), Litton Industries and ITT.  
 The antitrust environment was stricter in this period. In addition to Sherman and Clayton 
Acts, a new piece of legislation (Celler-Kefauver Act passed in 1950) strengthened antitrust 
enforcement. This resulted in a reduced number of horizontal mergers relative to the first two 
merger waves. 
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Table 1-3: Number of Mergers - Third Merger Wave (Gaughan, 2005, p.40) 
 
  
1.3.4 Merger Wave 4: 1984 - 1989 
 The fourth merger wave occurred from 1984 to 1989, coinciding with a period of 
economic prosperity. Debt was more aggressively used to finance mergers. Larger deals in the 
billion-dollar range emerged in this period, and the term leveraged buyout (LBO) became 
commonplace in Wall Street. Leveraged buyouts allowed smaller companies to bid for relatively 
larger targets. They were also used to take public companies private. 
 An interesting characteristic of the fourth merger wave was the emergence of ‗corporate 
raids‘. A corporate raid is a type of hostile takeover in which the assets of the acquired company 
are sold off soon after the transaction as a means of generating profits for the buyer. Also referred 
to as breaking a company, this process effectively dismantles the target company and disposes its 
valuable land, buildings, equipment and any other assets that can be converted to cash.  In some 
cases a shell of the company may be kept so the business can continue to operate on a smaller 
scale.  
1.3.5 Merger Wave 5: 1992 – 2000 
 The fifth merger wave occurred from 1992 to 2000 following the economic recession of 
1990. The period saw large merger deals similar in size to those of the fourth merger wave. The 
number of transactions was also similar to that of the fourth wave. By this time, many of the 
highly leveraged buyouts of the fourth wave were in bankruptcy. Having learned their lessons, 
managers took a more conservative approach in acquisitions and, thus, highly debt-financed 
Year
Number of 
Mergers
1963 1361
1964 1950
1965 2125
1966 2377
1967 2975
1968 4462
1969 6107
1970 5152
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mergers were less common in the fifth wave. The focus of acquisitions shifted from short-term 
financial gains to long-term business strategies. One such long term strategy was to gain size and 
‗critical mass‘ which was followed by companies in varied industries such as banking, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunication, oil, and gas (Geddes, 2006, p. 107). 
 It is important to note the effect of deregulation as a source of industry shock in this 
merger wave. A significant number of deregulations occurred in industries such as financial 
services, health care, utilities, media, and telecommunication. Andrade et al (2001) call 1990s the 
―decade of deregulation‖. The authors suggest that deregulation was the dominant factor in 
mergers and acquisitions after the late 1980s and accounted for nearly half of the merger activity 
since then until 2001. 
 Another theory was also used to explain the fifth merger wave. Shleifer & Vishney 
(2003) suggest that merger transactions are driven by the stock market valuation of the merging 
firms.  The theory assumes that financial markets are inefficient. This results in some stocks to be 
overvalued. On the other hand, managers are assumed to be completely rational and capable of 
identifying misvalued firms. The theory suggests that the fifth merger wave occured as the 
managers of overvalued firms acquired less overvalued firms.   
1.3.6 Merger Wave 6: 2003 – 2007 
 The sixth merger wave started in 2003, climaxed in 2006 with more than $1 trillion spent 
in U.S mergers, and finished in 2007. Alexandridis et al. (2010) propose a few key differences 
between this merger wave and the fifth merger wave. First, cash and debt financing was used 
more in this merger wave. This is due to the abundance of liquidity and access to low cost capital 
as US corporate loan prime rates was lower in this period.  Second, the strength of acquirers‘ 
stock prices was more closely related to sound fundamentals rather than over-optimistic 
expectations. As such, the acquirers were less overvalued compared to the 1990s resulting in a 
less variance between acquirer and target ‗overvaluation‘ compared to the fifth merger wave. 
Thus, change in overvaluation was not considered as a motivation for mergers of the sixth wave. 
Third, there was less overpayment seen compared to the fifth wave. This was associated with less 
management hubris, reduced competition to gain corporate control, and more realistic valuation 
of target firms.  
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 The wave ended approximately in 2007 coinciding with the start of the financial crisis 
leading to an economic recession. During the recession, financial institutions limited their credit 
extension to firms. As a result, liquidity and financing available to firms reduced which in turn 
hampered the ability of businesses to pursue mergers and acquisitions in general. However, since 
recession‘s end in mid 2009, the credit markets have improved.  
 Based on the historical M&A waves, it is anticipated that such trends will continue in the 
future. To take advantage of windows of opportunities, it is important for firms to keep abreast of 
these trends. One way this can be achieved is through monitoring economic upturns and 
downturns which generally coincide with increases and declines in the rates of M&As.  
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2. Motivations behind M&A 
 Mergers and acquisitions are pursued for a variety of reasons. One of the most important 
reasons is to establish positive changes that maximize shareholder value through achieving 
synergies. The concept of ‗synergy‘ was first introduced in 1962 by Igor Ansoff, known as the 
father of strategic management, who used his famous ―2+2=5‖ analogy to convey the message 
that combined firms might have the potential to generate greater shareholder value compared to 
the sum of individual firms.  
 Establishing positive change and, thus, maximizing shareholder value is a common 
motivation for mergers and acquisitions. However, there are some other motivations that do not 
necessarily align with the goal of maximizing shareholder value. This section lists many of the 
common motivations for M&As and discusses whether or not they are aligned with the goal of 
maximizing shareholder value.  
2.1 Operational Synergy 
 Many mergers are pursued in order to achieve operational synergies. There are two 
general sources of operational synergies both focusing on increasing efficiencies, and thus 
reducing average cost per unit of production. These sources stem from economies of scale and 
economies of scope.  
 Economies of scale are best understood as cost advantages due to spreading fixed costs 
over increasing production units. In economic terms, fixed costs are those that do not change 
when output volume changes. Whether the company produces 100 or 10,000 units, it still incurs 
the same amount of fixed costs. By increasing output levels, the fixed cost is divided over a larger 
number of products and as such average cost per unit of production is lowered. Economies of 
scale do not continue to exist as the output level is increased beyond a certain level. As shown in 
Figure 2-1, the relationship between long-run average cost and output level is represented by a U 
shaped curve. While initially, the expansion of output allows the company to enjoy production at 
a lower long-run average cost, after a certain point, Q*, an increase in output actually causes 
an increase in production costs. This condition is known as diseconomies of scale. Synergies are 
achieved if the merger allows the firm to increase output to a maximum of Q*. 
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Figure 2-1: Synergies and Economies of Scale (Baye,2009, p.187) 
 Economies of scale can be exploited in several areas of the business. In production, the 
same equipment or facility may be used to produce larger number of output. As a result, costs 
such as building rent, equipment lease, depreciation of capital assets, and insurance can be split 
over larger number of produced units. In purchasing, a larger purchase volume provides the 
purchasing agent with more power over suppliers to negotiate reduced pricing. In business 
development, the costs for advertising and promotional activities can be spread over a larger 
scale. Similarly, in administration, various overhead costs are divided over a large number of 
units. 
 Economies of scale can be a significant source of increasing shareholder value for 
merged companies. When implemented and managed properly, cost savings in different areas of 
the business can be realized. Another manner in which economies of scale contribute to 
shareholder value is through increasing entry barriers as it would be very difficult or costly for 
new entrants to establish similar efficiencies. This leads to reduced entries that in turn result in 
less intense competition. Lower competition translates into higher margins generating higher 
returns for shareholders.  
 Economies of scope are defined as cost advantages in utilizing the firm‘s assets or skills 
to produce new additional related products or services. Typically, economies of scope are realized 
when it is cheaper to combine two or more product lines in one company than to produce them in 
separate companies (DePamphilis, 2010, p.7).  For instance, Honda uses its skills in developing 
internal combustion engines to produce several lines of products such as automobiles, 
motorcycles, lawn mowers, and snow blowers.  
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 When companies merge, they have an opportunity to combine their skills, technologies 
and equipment towards creating new related products that they were not able to produce 
previously. This results in a more efficient use of common factors of production which leads to 
economies of scope which in turn increases shareholder value.  
2.2 Financial Synergy 
 A merger and acquisition may be pursued to achieve financial synergies. Financial 
synergies result from the reduction in cost of capital for the merged firms, access to high growth 
investment opportunities, and tax benefits. All of these factors positively contribute to 
shareholder value.    
 Large firms whose growths are slowing in matured markets or industries may be cash 
rich and produce excess cash flows well in excess of investment opportunities. These firms 
generally have good credit ratings and have the ability to raise capital in the financial markets 
with favorable rates. In contrast, smaller firms in high-growth industries have far more 
opportunities for investment but may not have the capital to support investments. Obtaining 
capital for these companies is not always possible due to higher business/industry risks and 
perhaps their inability to demonstrate a high enough internally generated cash flow. Even if they 
succeed in securing capital, it is most probably at a higher interest rate compared to established 
low risk firms. Combining these firms could result in a lower cost of capital for the merged firms. 
 Tax savings could be a major financial synergy pursued by some acquirers. A firm might 
have tax shields in the form of unused carry forward losses or tax credits that is not able to use.  
Merging with such firms allows profit making firms to use the tax shield against profits. 
Auerbach (1987, p.81) suggest that potential transfer of unused tax credits and tax losses was the 
most significant tax-related factor in mergers of 1970s and early 1980s. Although regulations 
have been introduced to limit the ability of firms to engage in mergers with the sole intention of 
achieving tax benefits, companies still consider tax consequences as a major factor in analyzing 
the attractiveness of a merger. 
2.3 Strategic realignment 
 Further generating motivation for mergers and acquisitions is strategic realignment. The 
theory of strategic realignment suggests that M&As can be used by firms to rapidly adjust to 
  
15 
changes in their external environment (DePamphilis, 2010, p.9). Two strong external changes are 
changes in regulatory environment and technological innovations. These changes are so profound 
that can create major shifts in an industry and even destroy previous lines of business.  Some 
firms choose to merge in order to quickly take advantage of new opportunities and to respond to 
the threat of becoming obsolete by new technologies. Strategic realignment, whether due to 
changes in regulatory environment or technologies, provides opportunities to increase shareholder 
value. 
 Changes in regulatory environment influence merger activity and industry 
transformation. Although some changes such as introduction of antitrust legislation hindered 
mergers that were believed to be anticompetitive, other changes such as vast deregulations in the 
1990s provided opportunities for strategic mergers and acquisitions. Deregulation acts as a 
catalyst for industry transformation by removing barrier to entry to industries that were previously 
exclusive. When barrier to entry is removed competition increases and the stage is open for 
strategic mergers and acquisitions. A few examples are provided to illustrate how deregulation 
spurred merger activity; since the great depression, banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies were prevented from merging. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
repealed the legislation and proliferated merger activity towards creation of huge financial 
services firms. Another example is in telecommunication industry. Historically, regulation 
prevented local and long-distance phone companies to compete with each other. In 1996 this 
barrier was removed by the passage of Telecommunication Reform Act.  
 In addition to regulatory environment changes, technological changes also ignite merger 
activity. Technological innovations have the potential to radically change the industry by creating 
new and unexpected products and markets. These innovations are typically found in smaller and 
more dynamic firms that can quickly adjust to the needs of the market. Large and bureaucratic 
companies lack the speed and creativity of smaller companies to innovate. In order to cope with 
rapid technological changes, large firms choose to acquire the smaller firms to get access to their 
technology. This can help establish a competitive advantage and also defend against the threat of 
obsolescence. Another strategic advantage of acquiring new key technologies is to keep them out 
of competitors‘ hands.  
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2.4 Diversification 
 Another motivation for mergers and acquisitions is to diversify beyond the firm‘s current 
primary line of business. Diversification is categorized into related and unrelated diversification. 
In a related diversification, a firm either sells new products to its existing market or sells existing 
products to new markets. In either case, the firm has prior familiarity with either the product or 
the market. For example, a local soup manufacturing firm may diversify into pastry 
manufacturing. In this case the product is new but the market is the same.  Now consider the same 
soup manufacturing company decides to export its products to the US market. In this example, the 
product is the same, but the market is different. In contrast, in an unrelated diversification both 
the product and the market are new to the firm.  For instance, Virgin brand is diversified into 
unrelated industries such as airline, retail, entertainment, communication and hospitality. 
Unrelated diversification is an inherently riskier strategy because the firm has little or no 
experience with the product or market.  
 It is interesting to explore why firms use merger and acquisition to diversify. One reason 
is to take advantage of the financial synergies that result in reduced cost of capital. Another 
reason is to move from a saturated business to a business with higher growth prospects. In an 
unrelated diversification, however, none of these reasons seem to create shareholder value. In 
fact, empirical research shows that unrelated diversification generally destroys shareholder value 
(Lamont and Polg, 2000). Share prices of conglomerate firms typically trade at a discount 
compared to share prices of focused firms. There are a few factors contributing to the decline in 
shareholder value. First, investors find conglomerate firms to be riskier because they perceive the 
managing of such companies to be more difficult as the operation is spread across unrelated 
industries. Second, investors find it difficult to value various segments of a conglomerate firm. 
Third, expected financial synergies are not realized because many diversified firms fail to allocate 
capital efficiently among different segments.   
2.5 Hubris (Managerial Pride) 
 Sometimes mergers are pursued due to management hubris. Hubris is extreme pride or 
arrogance in one‘s capabilities such that reality is overlooked. It is combined with overconfidence 
it one‘s assertions.  Management hubris can harm shareholder value in a variety of cases. 
Sometimes managers neglect the market‘s valuation of a target firm and believe that a target firm 
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should be valued higher. Overconfidence in their estimates drives managers to overpay to acquire 
the target. This situation is exacerbated when there is a competition between bidders. The urge to 
win can result in a bidding war that pushes the purchase price well over the true valuation. In 
other cases, management may overestimate the synergies that can result from mergers.  Managers 
who are overconfident in their abilities to create and take advantage of the synergies are enticed 
to bid higher than the target‘s true valuation. 
2.6 Buying undervalued assets 
 Purchasing undervalued assets is another motivation for some mergers and acquisitions. 
Sometimes the stock valuation of a target firm is lower than the replacement costs of its assets. 
This could be caused by high inflation rate or interest rates which result in the replacement costs 
to be higher than the target firm‘s book value of assets. A firm that wishes to expand its 
operations could acquire such a firm instead of investing in building new plant and equipment. 
DePamphilis (2011, p. 11) notes that buying undervalued assets was a common motivation in the 
mergers of the1970s when high inflation and interest rates caused the stock prices to be lower 
than the book value of many firms. For a more recent example, DePamphilis (2011, p. 11) points 
out the acquisition of Premcor Inc by Valero Energy Corp for $8 billion in 2005 which created 
North America‘s largest gasoline refinery. It was estimated that it would cost Valerco 40 percent 
more to build a new refinery with the capacity equivalent to that of Premcor.  
 Buying undervalued assets definitely contributes to shareholder value. However, the 
acquirer must ensure that the assets of the target firm are indeed undervalued and the decision is 
not influenced by management hubris.  
2.7 Manageralism 
 Some mergers and acquisitions are pursued to satisfy management‘s self interest. These 
interests can be classified into two categories:  First, managers may want to increase their 
influence and prestige by building large empires. Second, they might pursue higher 
compensations by linking their compensation to the size of the firms they manage. These 
motivations are unlikely to create value for the combined organization and, thus, shareholders do 
not benefit from these mergers and acquisitions. 
 
  
18 
2.8 Market Share 
 Increasing market share is another motivation for mergers and acquisitions. A larger 
market share provides a company with potentially more profits and could positively contribute to 
shareholder value. One of the benefits of a larger market share is the possibility of economies of 
scale that the combined firms could enjoy.  Another benefit is the perception that it creates among 
customers; when a company has a large market share, it is perceived to be more successful. This 
perception could result in a stronger reputation for the company which in turn could attract more 
customers and contribute to more market share. Another benefit of a large market share is the 
increased number of customers. This would reduce the risk of reliance on a few customers.   
 Sometimes, the motivation for M&A is more ambitious than just an increase in the 
market share and is driven by a desire to move towards monopoly power. By increasing the 
monopoly power, companies would be able to set sustainable prices at a higher level compared to 
a competitive market. Higher prices could increase revenue if the demand for product or service 
is inelastic (Baye, 2009, p.78). 
2.9 Geographical Expansion 
 Another motivation for mergers and acquisitions is to expand a company‘s operations 
beyond its geographical boundaries.  This is typically pursued in horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions. The acquiring companies generally search for targets that have a strong local 
connection, customer base and reputation. Geographical expansion typically results in increased 
market share. As explained in section 2.8, increased market share positively contributes to 
shareholder value.  
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3. Change Management  
 To achieve desired synergies, merged firms need to go through some changes. Because it 
is employees that allow the organizations to realize their change objectives, it is critical to 
effectively manage employees through change. Mergers and acquisitions can be threatening for 
some employees and create strong anxiety and stress. Schweiger and Ivancevich (1985) identify 
some common merger stressors as uncertainty, insecurity, fears of job loss, job changes, 
compensation changes, and changes in power, status, and prestige. Mergers and acquisitions are 
stressful for employees because they have the potential to significantly change employees‘ 
working lives yet fail to provide them with any control over the event. Hunsaker and Coombs 
(1988, p.58) discovered distinct phases of emotional reactions experienced by employees during a 
merger or acquisition. These emotional patterns are labeled as ―Merger Emotion Syndrome‖.  It is 
critical to recognize these emotional patterns and effectively manage employees through the 
stages in order to turn employees into productive forces.  Effective change management enables 
employees to embrace the new direction of the merged firms and positively contribute towards 
achieving desired synergies.  
 This chapter starts with a study of various phases of merger emotion syndrome. Next, 
principles of change management are introduced. Following an understanding of change 
management concepts, different frameworks for change management are explored. 
3.1 Changes in Employee Emotions – “Merger Emotion Syndrome”  
 During a merger or acquisition, many employees go through a sequential phases of 
feelings. Hunsaker and Coombs (1988, p.58) identified a 9-stage transition model for employee 
feelings in the midst of merger and acquisition. These stages are denial, fear, anger, sadness, 
acceptance, relief, interest, liking and enjoyment. As demonstrated in Figure 3-1, the first four 
phases represent a downswing in employee emotions which is followed by a neutral acceptance 
mode. After the neutral phase is passed, positive emotions start to develop.  
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Figure 3-1: Stages in the Merger Emotions Syndrome (Hunsaker & Coombs 1988, p.60) 
 This section describes each phase of the merger emotion syndrome and provides 
examples where applicable. It is important for management to understand and recognize each 
phase so that they can properly manage employees through the phases.  
Denial: 
 Initially, many employees react to the new of the merger or acquisition with denial. They 
perceive it to be just a rumor. Many would pretend that the news has not been given and 
effectively shut their eyes to any evidence that suggests to the contrary. They feel that the merger 
will not actually happen or that it will not cause any changes to their work and organization.  
Fear: 
 After the initial denial stage, as the merger or acquisition becomes a reality, employees 
start to develop fears of the unknown and imagine worst case scenarios. Rumors of mass layoffs 
and terminations spread throughout the organization. Uncertainties lead to stress and anxiety 
regarding fear of job loss, job changes, compensation changes, and changes in power, status, and 
prestige. This typically results in declined employee engagement and productivity.  
Anger: 
 At this stage, employees have fully realized that the merger or acquisition is a reality and 
that they are unable to prevent it from taking place. Since they don‘t have any control over the 
situation, they feel angry towards the people who are responsible for it; anger is typically targeted 
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at senior management. Another characteristic of this phase is that employees feel management 
has betrayed them by selling them out. This feeling is usually strong among the employees of the 
acquired firm. They may feel that they have been sold out after being loyal to the company for 
several years and providing it with quality work. 
Sadness: 
 Once the employees pass through the anger phase, the feelings of sadness emerge. 
Employees show signs of grievance over the loss of corporate identity and culture. The idea of 
changing good old norms and processes is especially unpleasant to them. It is in this stage that 
employees start to concentrate on the differences between the two firms and criticize the 
processes of the other firm. A mindset of ‗we‘ versus ‗they‘ developes in this stage.   
Acceptance: 
  Following a sufficient period of grievance, employees realize that regardless of whether 
they liked it or not, the merger or acquisition occurred and it would be useless for them to resist 
the situation. At this point, employees begin to accept the merger or acquisition and try to find 
something positive about it. Anderson (1999, p.2) suggests that while employees may become 
behaviorally compliant in this stage they are not necessarily committed to the organization.  
Relief: 
 Once employees make the transition through the acceptance phase, most begin to feel 
more settled in the new organization. As more contact is developed between the employees of 
both firms, they become more accustomed to working together. It is at this stage that employees 
start to feel relieved and recognize that the situation is not as bad as they had envisioned. They 
begin to feel that the new employees are actually better than what they had predicted and, thus, 
the mindset of ‗we‘ versus ‗they‘ begins to diminish.  
Interest: 
 Once employees feel relieved and become settled in their new positions, previous feelings 
of stress and anxiety start to disappear. Employees become interested in the new organizations 
and find positive elements in it. They realize the new entity provides benefits and opportunities. 
  
22 
Consequently, they start to look at it as a challenge in which they strive to prove their capabilities 
and worth.   
Liking: 
 By this stage a positive momentum has started. It is energizing for employees to discover 
new opportunities that they had not envisioned before. As they get more comfortable with their 
roles and the organization, many employees begin to actually like their new situations.  
Enjoyment: 
 The final stage of merger emotion syndrome is enjoyment. In this phase, some employees 
have become fully comfortable with their new role and organization. They see that the new 
process is working out well and as such there are no fears of insecurity and uncertainty. Once 
employees reach this stage, the commitment level increases and employees become more and 
more engaged. 
3.2 Change Management Principles 
 Change management is a systematic approach utilized to transition individuals, teams, 
and organizations from a current state to a desired state in the future. Formal change management 
includes a set of processes designed to encourage new attitudes and behaviors that align with the 
change objective. The goal of these processes is to minimize resistance to change and mobilize 
the staff towards achieving the firm‘s goals. 
 There are some fundamental steps that are common in most change management 
programs. First, in order to engage employees, management should convey the need for change. 
This need can originate from either internal or external environments. It could be in response to 
an immediate threat or perhaps a strategic decision that has long term impacts. Regardless of what 
the reason is, an effective change management program has to ensure that people understand why 
change is necessary and why it needs to happen at that time. Second, there should be a clear 
vision that demonstrates the direction and desired outcomes. A clearly articulated and 
communicated vision provides a focus for the firm and a rallying point for staff (Shepherson, 
1994, p.5). Third, a consensus about what needs to change should be developed among influential 
members of the task force. These members will be instrumental in motivating staff and 
mobilizing commitment towards implementing change. Forth, the change needs to be managed 
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similar to a project. This will include all project management steps such as planning, 
implementing, monitoring, and adjusting. Many change management programs recommend 
assigning a dedicated project manager to lead the change through its various steps.   
3.3 Frameworks and Processes 
 In this section, different frameworks for change management are introduced. These 
frameworks help firms to systematically approach a change initiative and provide different 
perspectives on necessary steps involved in each framework. Furthermore, the relationship 
between merger emotion syndrome and change management phases is explored when applicable. 
3.3.1 Kurt Lewin’s Model: Unfreeze, Change, Freeze 
 One of the simplest and most widely used frameworks for change management is Kurt 
Lewin‘s three stage model of Unfreeze, Change and Freeze proposed in 1947 (―Kurt Lewin 
Change Management model‖, 2011). Kurt Lewin was one of the first to research group dynamics 
and organizational development. He is recognized as the founder of social psychology for his 
work in this domain. Despite the simplicity of his three stage model, it can be applied to a variety 
of change management scenarios. Although much has changed since 1947, his model is still very 
relevant and is used as a foundation for many of the subsequent change management models.   
 Before explaining the three steps of Kurt Lewin‘s model, it is helpful to first describe 
Lewin‘s theory of Force Field Analysis. This theory states that human behavior is a dynamic 
balance of two categories of opposing forces: driving forces and restraining forces. Driving forces 
are those that promote change. In contrast, restraining forces are those that resist change.  If these 
forces have equal power, equilibrium occurs. In an equilibrium state, the status quo is preserved 
and no change occurs as illustrated in Figure 3-2.  For change to happen one must disturb the 
equilibrium by either strengthening the driving forces or weakening the restraining forces or a 
combination of both.  
  
24 
 
Figure 3-2: Driving & Restraining Forces in Equilibrium (Adopted from: “Force Field 
Analysis”, n.d.)  
 The force field analysis integrates well with Lewin‘s three stage change management 
process. In the first stage, referred to as ―unfreeze‖, the focus is on disturbing the existing 
equilibrium. To achieve this, the firms first need to identify both the driving forces and restraining 
forces, and then take measures to add driving forces that promote change or reduce restraining 
forces that favor the status quo or do a combination of both.  To do so, the reasons for change 
have to be understood and effectively communicated to affected employees. A valid and 
understandable reason results in a stronger driving force and minimizes resistance to maintain the 
status quo. In addition to providing the reason for change, a desirable vision and goal needs to be 
created. The vision will motivate employees to change and, thus, boost the driving force. Another 
element that positively contributes to the unfreeze stage is to create a sense of urgency which 
speeds up this stage.  
 
Figure 3-3: Kurt Lewin's Change Management Model (Adopted from:”Kurt Lewin Change 
Management Model”, 2011)  
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 The second stage of Lewin‘s model deals with the actual change. The change is viewed 
as a process rather than an event. This process involves changes in employees‘ thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors as they go through the transition from old ways of doing things to new ways of 
doing things.  During this stage, it is critical to support employees through the transition to reduce 
resistance. The support can take many forms. One important support is to provide employees with 
training and coaching to prepare them for new procedures. Restraining forces are diminished as 
employees get trained and become comfortable with the new ways. It is also important to 
recognize that a part of the restraining forces stem from employees‘ anxiety in regards to fear of 
making mistakes as they learn the new process. Understanding that mistakes are inevitable, 
developing a tolerance for mistakes, and supporting employees through the learning curve help 
reduce this restraining force.  Another contributing factor in this stage is the use of role models. 
Role models add to the strength of the driving force by providing aspiration for change and 
demonstrating benefits of the change to other employees.  
 The third stage in Lewin‘s model is ―freezing‖. This stage is focused on stabilizing post-
change processes and freezing new attitudes and behaviors. These new processes, attitudes and 
behaviors will be the new norms accepted by employees. This is in effect a new equilibrium state 
in which the driving forces and restraining forces become balanced. Freezing the change at the 
new equilibrium create resistance to further change. This stage of the Lewin‘s model is criticized 
in terms of its applicability to modern environment in which firms need to go through more 
frequent changes compared to 1940s. More recent change management programs have modified 
this step to address this concern. While they recognize the need for reinforcement of the newly 
developed processes, these programs promote flexibility to respond to further change.   
 In the context of change management in a merger and acquisition, understanding the 
merger emotion syndrome plays a key role in implementing Lewin‘s model. As discussed, 
Lewin‘s model is based on identifying both the driving forces and restraining forces, and then 
taking measures to strengthen the driving forces or weaken the restraining forces or a 
combination of both. But how can one identify these forces? The response lies in the behaviors of 
the employees. These behaviors alert the observer to the presence of driving and restraining 
forces. For example, the first few steps of the merger emotion syndrome signal restraining forces 
due to denial, fear, anger and sadness. These forces can be minimized by taking measures such as 
providing reasoning for change, clear vision of the new direction, and supporting employees with 
training.  
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3.3.2 Prosci’s Model: ADKAR® 
 Prosci is one of the world‘s leading firms in the area of change management. Founded in 
1994, the firm has conducted extensive change management research on more than 2000 
organizations from 65 countries, including 6 longitudinal studies. (―About Prosci‖, n.d.). The 
result of this research is a change management model called ADKAR® which has been widely 
adopted and become a best practice for firms and government agencies. According to Prosci‘s 
website more than half of the fortune 100 companies have used this model. 
 The ADKAR model is founded on two beliefs: First, it is people who allow the firms to 
change. Second, successful organizational change occurs only when individual employees are 
able to transition successfully. Therefore, the model focuses on actions necessary for successful 
individual change which will bring successful organizational change. 
 ADKAR is a sequential model with five building blocks as shown in Figure 3-4. The 
building blocks are Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability and Reinforcement. For the model to 
be successful, each step has to be completed before the next step starts.  
 
Figure 3-4: ADKAR Model of Change Management (Adopted from: “About Prosci”, 
n.d.;”ADKAR: Simple, Powerful”, 2011) 
 This section explains each building block of the ADKAR model: 
1. Awareness – The first key aspect of this model is the understanding of the reasons for 
change. This step focuses on why change is necessary and explores the reasons and 
thoughts that underline a required change. Communication is the most critical element of 
this step. Appropriate communication channels need to be utilized to ensure that the 
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message has reached to every individual. When this step is successfully completed, every 
employee should know the reasons for change.    
2. Desire – Once employees are fully aware of the reasons for change, they are ready for the 
next step which is to build desire to participate and support the change. Building desire is 
done through motivating employees and creating incentives that are aligned with the 
change. Once this step is successfully completed, each employee has reached a point 
where he/she has made a personal decision to support the change and contribute to it.   
3. Knowledge – The third step of the model deals with providing employees with the 
necessary knowledge for the change.  This is achieved through formal and informal 
training. Formal training involves educational mediums such as classes, seminars, 
workshops, and simulations. Informal training involves coaching, mentoring, forums and 
blogs. Regardless of the medium used, the goal of this step is to provide each employee 
with the knowledge on how to transition from current state to desired state and also how 
to perform in the new state once change is fully implemented. 
4. Ability – The ADKAR model recognizes the difference between theory and practice. 
While the previous step provided the employees with the ‗theory‘ or knowledge of how 
to change and how to perform in the new world, this step focuses on the ability of 
employees to actually perform. Providing support for employees is particularly critical in 
this stage. To achieve the desired level of performance, employees need to go through a 
cycle of practice, coaching and feedback.   
5. Reinforcement – The last step of the model focuses on sustaining changes. The goal of 
this step is to ensure that changes remain in effect and employees do not return to old 
ways of doing things.  Reinforcement is done through providing employees with positive 
feedback, rewarding desirable actions, recognizing accomplishments, measuring 
performance and taking corrective actions.  
3.3.3 ExperiencePoint’s Model: 7 Steps to Change Management 
 ExperiencePoint, founded in 1996, is a firm specialized in providing powerful 
simulations for change management and innovation. Its model for change management, seven 
steps to change management, is an effective model that has been globally adopted by high profile 
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firms and organizations. Some examples of ExperiencePoint‘s clients include the United Nations, 
GE, Nokia, SAP, Microsoft, Bayer, US Steel, the US Armed Forces, TD Canada Trust, CIBC, 
Astra Zeneca, and Habitat for Humanity. Clients also include leading business schools such as 
Kellogg, Duke, Rotman, Cambridge, Columbia, SFU, HEC, UNC, Michigan, etc. 
(―ExperiencePoint At a Glance‖, n.d.) 
 ExperiencePoint‘s seven steps to change management is a more comprehensive model 
compared to the Kurt-Lewin and ADKAR model.  Both these models assume that a decision to 
change has already been made and, thus, the models only focus on a framework for implementing 
and managing change. In contrast, ExperiencePoint‘s model guides organizations through both 
the decision making process and the implementation of change. As Figure 3-5 demonstrates, the 
model consists of two stages; the first stage focuses on aligning key stakeholders and includes 
three steps of Understand, Enlist, and Envisage. In this stage, the key stakeholders -usually senior 
executives- explore if or why a change is necessary, create a core change agent team and 
strategize on a vision and goal. It is at this stage that a decision to change is made. The second 
stage focuses on executing the change across the organization and includes four steps of 
Motivate, Communicate, Act and Consolidate.  
 
Figure 3-5: ExperiencePoint’s 7-step Model for Change management (Adopted 
from:”ExperiencePoint”, n.d.)  
Understand: 
 A successful change management program starts with a thorough understanding of the 
needs for change. To gain an understanding of the need for change, both the external and internal 
environments should be continuously monitored and carefully studied. External environment 
scanning includes investigating market changes, new innovations, technological changes, and 
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competitor undertakings. On the other hand, internal environment analysis includes assessments 
of formal and informal elements. Formal elements are the company‘s systems, structures and 
processes while informal elements refer to organizational values, attitudes and beliefs.  
Enlist: 
 Planning and implementing the change requires the input and cooperation of key 
stakeholders. Assembling an expert team of stakeholders plays a key role in successful planning 
and execution.  Thus, once the need for change is fully understood, a team of change agents 
should be enlisted.  
 There are certain criteria that the core team should meet: Powerful position in the 
organization, Expertise, Credibility, Leadership and Management skills. With these qualities, the 
team will be able to create a vision, communicate with the staff, motivate and energize staff, plan 
and execute the change. 
Envisage: 
 In this step, the vision and strategy are created and planned. Vision is a portrait of a 
desired end state of the change and strategy is the path to get there.  Creating a strong vision is 
very important as it gives people hope and motivation for change. A strong vision should have the 
following characteristics: It needs to be a tangible and desirable picture of a pleasant future state. 
It should be simple enough to be explained in a few minutes. Additionally, it should be feasible 
and flexible. Also the vision should be focused on the basic fundamental challenges rather than 
marginal issues. 
 Strategy is a precise and detailed plan that includes everyday decisions. Different issues 
such as market and product definition, utilizing certain ―systems, structures and processes‖ and 
competitive differentiation should be considered while creating the strategy. The process of 
creating the strategy needs to be participative, rigorous and open to new ideas and issues. 
Motivate: 
 One of the challenges of implementing change is convincing people that their present 
situation -no matter how secure it may seem- is not the ideal situation for the business, and the 
consequences of maintaining the status quo could be severe. This will create a sense of urgency 
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that motivates change. Other tactics for creating this sense of urgency is sharing competitive and 
financial information, organizing site visits, town halls and behavioral interventions –seminars 
and workshops. ExperiencePoint asserts that a change will not be accepted and supported if more 
than 75 percent of people in an organization don‘t feel the urgency for change (ExperiencePoint, 
n.d.) 
Communicate: 
 Before taking any action to change the systems, structures and processes of an 
organization, the vision should be communicated to the affected employees to give them a 
guiding path and framework. For better communication of the vision, it should be repeated 
frequently to help employees understand it and see its importance. Furthermore, the message 
should be consistent in all corporate communication and in different communication channels that 
broadcast the vision. Moreover, by creating job-specific communications that outline what 
changes and what remains unchanged, employees can better relate to the vision and help to 
achieve it. 
Act: 
 In this step, the formal organization –systems, structures and processes- should be aligned 
with the new vision and strategy.  To provide a definition for the elements of the formal 
organization, systems refer to organizational processes that support the day-to-day operations. 
Structures are the set of formal arrangements in an organization that define roles and 
relationships. Processes are the sets of sequenced activities that produce an output. Each of these 
elements should be adjusted to the new vision and strategy. 
 There are many systems in an organization that are influenced by a change of vision and 
strategy. The recruitment systems must attract and hire or retain the needed employees. The 
training systems should focus on competencies that support the new vision and strategy and the 
performance appraisal and reward systems should encourage and appreciate the new desired 
behavior. 
 New structures are often required for new visions and strategies. In order to align 
structures properly, filling key positions with the right people, shifting power between units and 
integration of some units should be considered. Important positions should ideally be filled with 
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known supporters. It is common to see an increase in resistance from some stakeholders as the 
power shifts in some units. Implementing integrative mechanisms, such as cross-functional 
project teams, promotes communication between the units and reduces this resistance. 
 Processes define how an output –products, services or information- is produced. 
Therefore, a change of vision and strategy results in a change of processes to attain the new goal. 
This change often involves the introduction of new technology. As a result, new technical training 
may be required. 
Consolidate: 
 After executing the change, the workload demands rise considerably until a steady state is 
reached. During this period many employees become stressed and overwhelmed. To keep 
employees motivated and maintain the momentum of change, planning for quick wins and 
following the quick wins with new targets could be very effective. Celebrating the attainment of 
realistic short-term objectives is a good way to encourage employees, but this celebration should 
not be considered as the final victory until the entire organization is aligned with the new vision 
and strategy. 
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4. Overview of VersaCold’s M&A Activity 
 Three models for change management have been presented. This paper uses these models 
to analyze two historical cases of M&A in VersaCold, a public refrigerated warehousing 
company. To provide context, section 4.1 provides an overview of the public refrigerated 
warehousing industry and section 4.2 provides an overview of VersaCold. Next, Versacold‘s 
M&A case studies are presented in section 4.3. 
4.1 Industry Overview - Public Refrigerated Warehousing  
 Climate sensitive products require special provisions for transportation and warehousing 
in order to safely deliver perishable food stock to consumers. Addressing this need has led to the 
formation of the public refrigerated warehousing (PWR) industry. Today, services offered by the 
public refrigerated warehousing industry are used in retail, commodity and manufacturing 
industries including food and liquor, pharmaceuticals, and chemical businesses. 
 The North American refrigerated warehousing is comprised of several incumbents. Table 
4-1 summarizes the names of the top 25 incumbents as well as the refrigerated space for each 
player. AmeriCold is the market leader in the industry holding approximately 35% market share, 
assuming refrigerated cubic feet is directly proportional to business revenues.  2010 industry 
revenues in the US totaled approximately $5.9 billion (―Refrigerated Storage in the US‖, 2010). 
In addition, the US has the largest cold storage capacity in the world (Salin, 2010, p. 24).   
 The number of players in the North American market suggests that the structure of the 
industry is perhaps monopolistic. However, power of incumbents is not evenly distributed. The 
four firm concentration ratio is 0.6. This is based on the assumption that total refrigerated area in 
the market is represented by total refrigerated area of the top 25 incumbents and that refrigerated 
area is directly proportional to revenue. This ratio suggests that a few industry players dominate 
the market. Because the industry is dominated by a few players, the overall rivalry in the North 
American industry is assessed to be medium. However, rivalry in the refrigerated warehousing 
industry varies by region depending on the demand for refrigerated warehouses in certain 
localities to service consumers in the region.  
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 Over the past, some consolidation has occurred – purchase of Versacold‘s US and other 
non-Canadian divisions by AmeriCold in December 2010 is an example of industry 
consolidation; this is also denoted by Terreri (2011, p. 22). Such consolidations could also occur 
in the future. If they do, the industry would be comprised of a reduced number of players. 
Consequently, less competition in the North American market would be expected to result. 
 The refrigerated warehouse industry exhibits average historical growth. In Canada, the 
refrigerated warehouse capacity grew at a CAGR of nearly 3.6% between the years 1998 and 
2010. This number for the US is approximated at 5% (Salin, 2010, p. 12). According to Salin 
(2010), the growth of refrigerated warehouse capacity depends on regional population.  However 
other factors could also affect future growth.  
 One factor would be changes in industry regulations. Regulations, focused on the safety 
of refrigerants used in cooling facilities, are becoming stricter in the industry (Terreri, 2011, p. 
22). This has led to harsh fines imposed on incumbents that do not comply with the new 
regulations. Increased regulations and fines could deter entries; it could also pressure the growth 
of incumbents. Another example would be changes in consumer habits. If demand for chilled and 
frozen food increases due to change in life styles, for instance, the demand for refrigerated 
warehousing could increase. Forecasting future industry growth requires consideration of these 
and similar factors that influence demand for refrigerated warehousing.  
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Table 4-1: North America's top 25 PRW companies and capacities(Adopted from “IARW North 
American”, 2011) 
 
 
4.2 VersaCold Overview 
 The origin of VersaCold goes back to 1946. At that time, B.C. Ice and Cold Storage 
Company, called VersaCold today, established a facility at Vancouver's waterfront to serve the 
fishing industry. From that time until the1980s, VersaCold had emerged as an established player 
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in the refrigerated warehousing industry in Western Canada, operating nearly 16.8 million cubic 
feet of refrigerated space. Since then, the company has grown both organically and through 
mergers and acquisitions.  
 VersaCold Corporation initially went public on Dec 8, 1993 (―IPO Prospectus‖, 2002). 
Following the proposal of company‘s board of directors, the company was reorganized on Feb 4, 
2002 through a court approved Plan of Arrangement pursuant to Section 252 of British 
Columbia‘s Company Act (―News release‖, 2002). The plan of arrangement converted the 
company from a corporate entity into an income fund trust. VersaCold Income Fund became 
public by purchasing 100% of the public shares of VersaCold Corporation. The company‘s shares 
were exchanged to fund units on a one-for-one basis (―News release‖, 2002). Since this was a 
share exchange, the underlying ownership of the public entity did not change. VersaCold was 
privatized on Aug 3, 2007 when Eimskip Holdings Inc., an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Hf. Eimskipafélag islands acquired all the issued and outstanding trust units of VersaCold Income 
Fund (―News release‖, 2007). 
 According to data presented in Table 4-1, it is currently one of the top five players in the 
North American refrigerated warehousing industry, holding nearly 5% of the market share in the 
region. Prior to the sale of US and other non-Canadian assets to AmeriCold in December 2010, 
the company offered a wide range of services to customers globally. Currently, however, it only 
serves Canadian markets. The following section discusses the services VersaCold offers and the 
market segments it serves. 
4.2.1 Services and Markets 
Reviewing the industry‘s supply chain facilitates the understanding of the services that 
the company offers. Figure 4-1 illustrates the supply chain of the industry.  
 
Figure 4-1: PRW Industry Supply Chain 
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  The PRW supply chain has four distinct constituents. Manufacturers or importers 
provide both processed and unprocessed products. Logistics service providers offer various 
services including storage, product handling and transportation. Distributors and wholesalers 
deliver a range of products from different manufacturers and producers to retailers or end 
customers. Lastly, retailers, such as supermarket chains and restaurants, distribute products to end 
consumers. In this supply chain, VersaCold services fall under the category of logistics service 
providers, as depicted in Figure 4-1.  
 VersaCold temperature controlled logistics services are threefold: storage, transportation 
and value-added services.  
Storage services 
 Storage services are offered to customers to allow them to store perishable goods in 
refrigerated warehouses. Goods may be stored in pallets, cases, or bulk. In general, customers are 
charged an initial storage and handling fee. Subsequently, they are charged recurring storage fees.  
Transportation services 
 VersaCold provides refrigerated transportation services through owned or managed fleets 
or subcontractors. Transportation services offered by VersaCold include retrieving items from 
warehouses and shipping them to retailers and wholesalers. In some cases, material may be 
retrieved and delivered to food processors for further processing. The company also offers online 
services for bills of lading, freight charges, and proofs of delivery and shipments.  
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Value-added services 
 VersaCold offers a variety of value-added services to its customers: Blast Freezing –
freezing products quickly with a focused control of sub-zero air; Free Flow Freezing –freezing of 
single fruit and vegetable products; Inventory Management; and, Facility Management, including 
consulting and support of logistics, are just a few examples. In addition to these, VersaCold also 
offers material handling services when required. Some goods are stored on pallets in warehouses 
and are delivered to destination points on pallets – this is called ―pallet-in-pallet-out‖. Typically, 
no additional handling service is required for these types. However, sometimes, customers may 
need to transport only a few cases from pallets or combine cases from different pallets. This 
would require special handling, which the company provides. 
 VersaCold offers its services to retail, commodity, and manufacturing sectors in Canada. 
In the retail sector, the company services supermarket chains and quick service restaurants 
primarily. These customers usually receive case based products from nearby distribution centers. 
These deliveries are made-to-order. The services that are offered to retail customers include the 
provision of storage space, cross docking, track and trace, transportation and delivery to store. In 
the commodity sector, VersaCold provides storage, packaging, and delivery services. These 
services pertain to products such as meat, poultry, fish, seafood, fruit and vegetables. Lastly, the 
services that the company offers to manufacturers include the provision of storage space, order 
selection, transportation and consolidation. Consolidation services include both the consolidation 
of numerous small loads into larger and more economic deliveries and the breakdown of larger 
shipment into smaller lots. 
4.3 M&A Case Studies at VersaCold  
 Thus far, this paper has covered the concepts of M&A, change management, and an 
overview of the PRW industry and VersaCold. These concepts are now applied to Versacold‘s 
mergers and acquisitions.  In this section, two M&A cases in VesaCold are presented. For each 
case, first the background of the acquired company is reviewed. Next, the characteristics of the 
M&, based on the material covered in sections 1 and 2, are explored.  
 The information for these cases is obtained by primary and secondary research. Some 
sources of information were VersaCold‘s external press releases, interviews with VersaCold‘s 
CEO, CFO and other senior management, VersaCold‘s internal communication news letter ‗Ice 
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line‘ and ‗briefing‘, VersaCold‘s internal announcement documents, and VersaCold‘s Human 
Resources memos ‗Talking Points‘ to facility managers giving advice on how to communicate the 
news of the M&A.  
4.3.1 Case 1 – Acquisition of Geneva Lakes Cold Storage/Wisconsin Logistics  
About Geneva Lakes & Wisconsin Logistics: 
 A family owned business, Geneva Lakes Cold Storage was founded in 1991 in Darien, 
Wisconsin, with Al Pokel Jr. as President and CEO. The company‘s roots, however, date back to 
the 1930s when Pokel‘s father founded the ‗Plymouth Ice & Cold Company‘. Al Sr. brought ice 
from the frozen mill pond in Plymouth, WI, carried it using horses, and stored it in a sawdust-
insulated warehouse to be delivered later to local homes and businesses.  As the refrigeration 
industry evolved, so did the company. By the 1950s, the company had three ammonia refrigerated 
warehouses and high profile customers such as Kraft and the US Dept. of Agriculture.  Al Sr. 
retired in the 1960s and left the company, which at the time had grown to two divisions of 
Northland Cold Storage and Plymouth Cold Storage, to his sons Jerry and Al Jr. Subsequently, 
Plymouth Cold Storage was sold. Over the next 25 years, the Pokels focused on expanding 
Northland Cold storage to include five different locations in Green Bay, WI, totaling over 
500,000 square feet. In 1990, Northland grew further and expanded outside of the Green Bay. In 
1991, the family decided to split the business into two companies one being Geneva Lakes Cold 
storage located in Darien, Wisconsin. Under the leadership of Al Pokel Jr., Geneva lakes Cold 
Storage continued to prosper over the next 12 years and was acquired by VersaCold in 2003. At 
the time, Geneva Lakes had a refrigerated storage capacity of 16 million cubic feet and was 
considered one of Wisconsin's largest public refrigerated warehousing companies. 
 Wisconsin Logistics was founded in 1996 to serve as the transportation division of 
Geneva Lakes Cold Storage Company. Starting modestly with only two semi-tractors and five 
trailers, the business grew to 40 semi tractors and 70 trailers. Wisconsin logistics operated out of 
the Geneva Lakes Cold storage facility in Darien under the same management. It offered 
truckload and less-than-truckload transportation services, both refrigerated and non-refrigerated. 
These services were provided not only to Geneva Lakes customers, but also to its own customers 
across the Midwest United States.   
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 Geneva Lakes was a financially appealing business with a stable revenue stream.  
According to VersaCold‘s press release (Oct 7, 2003), Geneva Lakes increased its revenues from 
2000 to 2002 by over 14%, from US$20.8 million to US$23.8 million. For the six months ended 
June 30, 2003, Geneva Lakes produced revenue of approximately US$10.4 million. The majority 
of this revenue was derived from two giant US food processors with which Geneva Lakes had 
long term relationship and long term contracts. These key customers were Kraft Foods Inc. and 
Bird Eye Foods, a leading manufacturer and marketer of frozen vegetables. Together, these two 
customers comprised 92% of Geneva Lakes revenue in 2002 (VersaCold‘s press release on Oct 7, 
2003). Under the contract with Kraft Foods, Geneva Lakes was the sole provider of refrigerated 
warehousing and logistics services until 2010 to all three of Kraft's frozen pizza production 
facilities in Wisconsin, where Kraft's entire U.S. pizza production was consolidated. Kraft was a 
customer of Geneva Lakes since 1994. Under the contract with Birds Eye Foods, Geneva Lakes 
was the provider of refrigerated warehousing and logistics services until 2006. Birds Eye was the 
largest producer of private label frozen vegetables in the US and a significant producer of branded 
frozen vegetables. The Geneva Lakes‘ 631,016 square feet facility was ideally located adjacent to 
Birds Eye's 350,000 square feet vegetable processing facility - the largest freezing plant in their 
network. Birds Eye Foods was a Geneva Lakes customer since 1991.  
Characteristics of the Acquisition: 
 VersaCold purchased the cold storage and logistics businesses of Geneva Lakes Cold 
Storage Inc. and Wisconsin Logistics Inc. (collectively 'Geneva Lakes') in 2003. The transaction 
was classified as an acquisition rather than a merger because VersaCold took complete ownership 
and control over Geneva Lakes. This was a private acquisition because Geneva Lakes was a 
private company at the time of the acquisition. The transaction was friendly rather than hostile. 
The Pokel family had listed their business for sale and VersaCold responded to the opportunity. 
Amicable negotiations were made between the family and VersaCold‘s management and both 
parties were pleased with the deal. As part of the deal, the Pokel family stayed for six months on 
contract after the sale to help smooth the transition.  
 From an economic perspective, this transaction was a horizontal acquisition as Geneva 
Lakes was operating in the same industry as VersaCold providing the same refrigerated 
warehousing and transportation services. At the time, VersaCold operated 23 temperature-
controlled facilities and a fully integrated national refrigerated distribution network in Canada. 
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The acquisition of Geneva Lakes increased VersaCold‘s total refrigerated storage space by 
approximately 26% to 77.1 million cubic feet. Prior to this acquisition, VersaCold did not have 
any presence is the US market. This acquisition was a key strategic move by VersaCold in 
pursuing its growth objectives and accessing the lucrative US market. ―Growth and acquisition 
are, of course, cornerstones of our business strategy,‖ said Chairman, President and CEO Brent 
Sugden in the announcement. ―This is an exciting opportunity for us to raise our profile in the US, 
and to strengthen our revenue stream.‖ It is worth mentioning that the acquisition of Geneva 
Lakes did not make VersaCold a key national player in the US market, but rather a small entrant 
with strong local presence. The intention was to penetrate the market and set the stage for future 
expansions.  To put this into perspective, Geneva Lakes‘ storage capacity of 16 million cubic feet 
is compared to the total public refrigerated warehouse capacity of the United States; According to 
the ―Capacity of Refrigerated Warehouses -2001 Summary‖ report retrieved from the United 
States Department of Agriculture (Jan 2002), the public general warehouse capacity totaled 2.25 
billion cubic feet in 2001. This means that Geneva Lakes only had 0.71% of the total capacity of 
the United States. Since VersaCold‘s market share was not significantly increased, its market 
power remained the same and service prices were unaffected. The US market had a monopolistic 
structure with many fragmented players. As such, players did not have a significant influence 
over prices.  
  From a financing view point, it was for the most part a cash transaction because the 
majority of the consideration between VersaCold and the Pokel family was cash. From 
VersaCold‘s perspective the US$45 million acquisition was funded by a combination of US$25 
million of seven-year, non-amortizing debt provided by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
the assumption of current equipment financing, and vendor financing, as well as by a portion of 
the net proceeds from the offering of debentures announced concurrent with the acquisition 
announcement. On Oct 7, 2003, VersaCold announced that it ―has entered into an agreement to 
sell, to a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., C$40 million principal amount of 
Convertible Extendible Subordinated Debentures with a coupon of 8.5% and convertible, at the 
option of the holder, into Units of Versacold at $8.35 per Unit.‖ This acquisition is consistent 
with the trend in the sixth merger wave of 2003 to 2007 in which most M&As were financed with 
cash and debt securities.  
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 From the motivational perspective, this acquisition was pursued to expand the 
geographical reach of the company into United States and position VersaCold for further 
acquisitions in the US. This was consistent with VersaCold‘s corporate strategy of growth and 
acquisition:  
“We look forward to growing our business with our existing customers at Geneva 
Lakes as they grow theirs. At the same time, we see opportunities to grow our 
overall customer base. The acquisition provides us with a platform for future 
expansion in the US and opportunities to expand our relationships with our new 
US customer base, while the addition of a US logistics business complements our 
already profitable transportation business in Canada.” said Versacold CEO, Brent 
Sugden in 2003. 
 Geneva Lakes was chosen for a few reasons. First, it had a strong relationship with two 
major US food processors: Kraft Foods Inc and Birds Eye Foods. ―We are very pleased to be 
entering a long-term relationship with Birds Eye Foods and expanding our existing relationship 
with Kraft into the US,‖ said Versacold CEO, Brent Sugden in 2003. Second, it had a consistent 
financial and operational track record. Due to its long term contracts with its two major 
customers, Geneva Lakes was expected to provide a stable and predictable revenue stream which 
was anticipated to be 10% of VersaCold‘s revenue post acquisition. ―Geneva Lakes is an 
important and valued partner to both of these major food processors, and our contracts with them 
will contribute a stable revenue stream to Versacold.‖ said Brent Sugden in 2003. Third, Geneva 
Lakes‘ transportation network was a complement to VersaCold‘s transportation network and 
would enhance VersaCold‘s cross-border transportation network.  
 An interview with VersaCold‘s senior executives in 2011 revealed that after 8 years 
VersaCold was still very pleased with this acquisition. They indicated that they achieved all the 
stated goals and objectives from this transaction and gave it a score of 5 out of 5.  
4.3.2 Case 2 – Acquisition of P&O Cold Logistics (POCL) 
About P&O Cold Logistics (POCL): 
 P&O Cold Logistics (POCL) was a division of Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company generally known as P&O. Before talking about POCL, this section provides a brief 
review P&O, its parent company. P&O was a British shipping and logistics company established 
in the early 19th century. For the initial 140 years of its operation P&O was mainly a shipping 
company. In the 1970s, the company started to diversify and engage in large construction 
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projects, house building, property investments and many other services not directly related to its 
core operations in freight and passenger shipping. It had become a global group of over 250 
companies. In the 1990s and early 2000s, however, most of these companies were sold as P&O 
decided to concentrate on ferries, ports and other logistics operations. (POCL was among the 
companies sold). P&O was a global player in port operations with involvements at 50 ports in 19 
countries around the world (―PONL Legacy‖, 2009). It was the biggest ferry operator in the UK 
and a top supplier of business-to-business logistics in Europe. P&O was acquired in March 2006 
by Dubai Ports World for £3.3 billion (―Our history‖, 2011). Currently P&O continues to operate 
as a subsidiary of Dubai Ports World but has retained its brand.   
 P&O Cold Logistics (POCL), a wholly-owned subsidiary of P&O, was one of the world‘s 
leading operators in the field of public refrigerated warehousing and distribution, a field that was 
non-core to its parent‘s line of business. Established in mid 1950s, POCL was an efficiently run 
and profitable business with a decentralized management model. It had a total of 49 modern 
facilities with a total refrigerated storage capacity of approximately 193 million cubic feet. A 
considerably large portion of POCL‘s operation was in the United States with 24 facilities and a 
total storage capacity of over 134 million cubic feet. The rest of the facilities were located in 
Australia, New Zealand and Argentina (Table 4-2). In all these four markets, POCL had a strong 
reputation and was among the top three PRW players. With over 3000 employees and hundreds 
of vehicles, POCL was delivering an integrated range of refrigerated warehousing and 
transportation services to a large customer base that included some high profile customers such as 
Dannon, Wal-Mart, Trader Joes and Breyers.  
Table 4-2: Facilities of VersaCold and POCL (―Versacold to Acquire P&O Cold Logistics‖, 
2005) 
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 POCL was acquired by VersaCold in November 2005 for C$382 million. At the time, 
POCL had shown a stable and growing financial performance.  In each of its four operating 
jurisdictions, POCL had generated a steady increase in revenue and EBITDA since 2002. For the 
12-month period ended June 30, 2005, POCL generated revenue of C$503.8 million and EBITDA 
of C$70.5 million. To provide a comparison, VersaCold generated revenue of C$179.8 million 
and EBITDA of C$34.0 million during the same period.  
Characteristics of the Acquisition: 
 The purchase of POCL is classified as an acquisition rather than a merger since 
VersaCold took complete ownership and control over POCL. Although VersaCold had a 
decentralized model of management and historically preferred to maintain the brand of its 
acquired companies, in this case it was contractually obligated to cease the use of POCL‘s name. 
As part of the contract, any use and reference to the name P&O or POCL needed to cease as soon 
as practically possible following the transaction. That included the registered or trading name of 
each facility, signage, logo, stationary documents and material, etc.  
 From a private versus public acquisition standpoint, this transaction falls under public 
category. This is due to POCL being a wholly-owned subsidiary of P&O which was a public 
company. P&O‘s stocks were traded on London Stock Exchange. The purchase was a friendly 
transactions in which the two parties came to a negotiated agreement.  As such, this was not a 
case of hostile takeover. 
 From a financing perspective, the transaction between VersaCold and P&O was a 
combination of issued debentures and cash. From the C$382 million purchase price, P&O agreed 
to take, as partial consideration for the purchase price, a US$60 million of a new series of 
extendible convertible unsecured subordinated debentures of Versacold.  The remainder was paid 
by cash through committed credit facilities with the Bank of Nova Scotia and the Toronto 
Dominion Bank.   
 From an economic perspective, the acquisition of POCL is classified as a horizontal 
acquisition because POCL was operating in the same industry -public refrigerated warehousing 
and distribution- and was providing the same services as VersaCold. At the time, VersaCold 
operated 25 temperature-controlled facilities (23 in Canada and 2 in the United States), with a 
total capacity of 79 million cubic feet while POCL had 49 facilities (24 in United States, 13 in 
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Australia, 10 in New Zealand , and 2 in Argentina) with a total capacity of 193 million cubic feet. 
This acquisition increased VersaCold‘s total capacity by 144%.  This acquisition enabled 
VersaCold to considerably expand its footprint in the United States and access new markets.   
 The acquisition of POCL had several motivations. First, it was a good fit with the 
corporate strategy of growth through acquisition. The corporate goal was to ―double the business 
by 2007‖.  As discussed previously, acquisition of Geneva Lakes started the path towards 
penetrating the lucrative US market and was intended as a starting point for more expansions in 
the United States. As such, POCL was viewed as a great candidate for acquisition as it had a 
considerable presence in the US market. ―The POCL acquisition fits ideally with our previously 
announced, ongoing program to pursue profitable growth through internal initiatives and 
accretive acquisition opportunities." said VersaCold‘s CEO, Brent Sugden, in a news release on 
Nov 1, 2005.  ―Although our initial interest was driven by the US assets, I‘m impressed with what 
I‘ve seen on a tour of the other locations. These are profitable, high-quality operations that 
operate virtually autonomously under the guidance of great management.‖ The acquisition of 
POCL was a fantastic milestone for VersaCold as it allowed it to actually triple the business by 
2006. In addition to the strategic fit, there was a great fit between the business models of the two 
companies, the culture of growth through expansion and the decentralized management approach. 
"I am especially pleased with the compatibility of POCL's management structure and the quality 
and experience of its senior management." said Brent Sugden.  
 The second motivation for the acquisition was its financial prospects. With this purchase, 
VersaCold acquired modern facilities in high quality locations at a very attractive price. The 
facilities were located in either high consumption areas or close to manufacturers. In either case, 
the facilities were very close to the source of revenue. Out of the 49 facilities acquired, 30 were 
owned, 17 leased and 2 managed. The promising financial prospects of the acquisition made it 
immediately accretive to distributable cash flow per unit. It, therefore, allowed VersaCold to 
increase its cash distribution to its investors by $0.07 to $1.00 per unit. This made VersaCold 
more attractive to investors. ―We are delighted and very fortunate to be acquiring a leading PRW 
business at a price that is immediately accretive" said Brent Sugden, CEO of Versacold in a news 
release on Nov1, 2005. 
 Another motivation for the acquisition of POCL was to gain market share and expand the 
customer base: 
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“The acquisition will significantly strengthen Versacold's North American platform 
by positioning us as the third largest PRW company in the strategically important 
U.S. market and, in particular, the market leader in two of the top U.S. regional 
markets - California and Texas. Versacold will also have a strong position in 
Boston, Las Vegas and Salt Lake City. In addition to the strong platform in the US, 
we are acquiring POCL's market-leading profitable PRW businesses in Australia, 
New Zealand and Argentina” said Brent Sugden, Versacold‘s CEO (VersaCold to 
acquire P&O Cold Logistics, 2005). 
 POCL was the second largest PRW company in Australia and New Zealand and was the 
largest in Argentina (Table 4-2). The acquisition also provided VersaCold with a significantly 
enhanced customer base with virtually no overlap among key customers. Through this acquisition 
Versacold gained several high profile customers that it did not service. These included large 
companies such as Breyer's, Dannon, Grocery Outlet, Pilgrim's Pride, Smart & Final, Trader Joes, 
Wakefern and Wal-Mart. 
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5. Analysis of Change Management in VersaCold’s M&A 
 This section analyzes VersaCold‘s effectiveness of change management for the two cases 
presented in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.  The effectiveness of change management is gauged using 
the three change management models presented in section 3.3. Following the analysis of the two 
cases, a comparison is made between how change was managed in these two cases.  
5.1 Case 1- Geneva Lakes Cold Storage/Wisconsin Logistics 
 The acquisition of Geneva Lakes did not introduce many changes to the operation of 
VersaCold and Geneva Lakes. VersaCold had a decentralized philosophy of operation that 
encouraged entrepreneurial spirit at the facility level. VersaCold‘s model of business operation 
was to provide its facility managers the autonomy to run their facilities as long as they delivered 
acceptable financial results. As such, Geneva Lakes was viewed just as a new facility with the 
same autonomy. Since Geneva Lakes had a consistent history of superior operational and 
financial performance, there was no need to change its operations. Therefore, business processes, 
systems, and human resources were left unchanged.  
“In keeping with our decentralized model, it will be business as usual at Geneva 
Lakes. We will retain the current owners on contract for six months to help smooth 
the transition. All of the roughly 180 employees of Geneva Lakes and Wisconsin 
Logistics will be kept on. Facility management will report directly to Prairie 
Region Vice-President Bruce Smashnuk.” said Versacold CEO, Brent Sugden in 
2003. 
1
  
 From the customers‘ perspective, there was also no change. Their point of contact and 
processes were kept the same. Both Geneva Lakes and Wisconsin Logistics retained their name. 
There was only a slight modification to the signage that added ‗a division of VersaCold Group‘. 
Overall, the scope of change was very limited.    
 To analyze the effectiveness of change management, the three frameworks presented in 
section 3.3 are used. First, Kurt Lewin‘s model is applied. Next, the ADKAR model is used and 
finally, the ExperiencePoint‘s seven step model is utilized. For each model a consistent scoring 
                                                     
1
 Source: Talking Point (Oct 7, 2003). Talking Point is an internal VersaCold news letter.  
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system is used to evaluate how well the change was managed. Table 5-1 shows the scoring 
scheme used.  
Table 5-1: Scoring Scheme 
 
5.1.1 Analysis based on Kurt Lewin’s Model 
 Kurt Lewin‘s model involves three steps of ‗unfreeze‘, ‗change‘ and ‗freeze‘.  The model 
is based on understanding the driving and restraining forces for change. The driving forces for the 
change were the desire of the Pokel family to sell their business and Versacold‘s desire to expand 
and grow in the United States. As far as the employees of the Geneva Lakes were concerned, this 
was the reason for the change and initiated the ‗unfreeze‘ phase. This phase was done quickly and 
efficiently. Through an excellent communication campaign, the employees of both VersaCold and 
Geneva Lakes were notified of the reasons for change. The communication was very strong 
throughout the change process and involved various channels such as internal newsletters (Ice 
line and Briefings), memos, announcements and emails as well as several facility visits and face 
to face meetings. This was consistent with communication best practices and was done very well 
throughout the change process. The success of the unfreeze phase is rated as ‗very high‘ or 5.  
 The next stage was the actual change. The restraining forces for the change were the 
anxiety of Geneva Lakes‘ employees in regards to the acquisitions. This is better understood in 
the context of the merger emotion syndrome discussed in section 3.1 particularly the Denial, Fear, 
Anger and Sadness stages. Geneva Lakes had 190 employees in total: 7 in management, 134 in 
Geneva Lakes and 49 in Wisconsin Logistics. To minimize the scope of change, VersaCold 
announced that it would keep all staff onboard. Although there was no plan to change the staff, it 
was still critical to manage employee emotions through the transition to minimize the restraining 
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forces of these employees, and to keep them engaged. Therefore, VersaCold‘s CEO, Brent 
Sugden, and VersaCold‘s Prairie Region Vice-President, Bruce Smashnuk, made repeated visits 
to Geneva Lakes facility, spoke with the staff and assured them of no change. Additionally, 
several communication vehicles such as internal newsletters (Ice line and Briefings), memos, 
announcements and email were used to reinforce the message and keep employees informed. 
VersaCold‘s strong communication throughout the transition resulted in the creation of trust in 
employees. VersaCold was viewed as a new ‗good owner‘. Although it is common to see a larger 
employee turnover in M&A cases, in this case no increase in employee turnover was seen. This is 
a testament to the success of change management in this case. Since VersaCold intentionally 
minimized the scope of change in the Geneva Lakes case and supplemented it with extensive and 
strong communication, the ‗change‘ phase was completed  very successful.  This phase is rated 5.   
 Following the change stage is the ‗freeze‘ stage. As employees became comfortable that 
the change does not affect them, they became settled in their roles and ‗freezing‘ occurred. The 
only real change occurred at the management level. For the local management, a Geneva Lakes 
manager was promoted to the position of Geneva Lakes general manager. This was a good 
decision as the general manager was already familiar with the business and had good 
relationships with the staff. This also sent a positive message to staff and indicated that 
VersaCold trusts the abilities of Geneva lakes managers rather than bringing a manager of its own 
to run Geneva Lakes. VersaCold also prudently retained the Pokel family for six months to assist 
in the transition. By the end of the sixth month, the general manager was fully settled in the role. 
The freezing stage was managed well and is assigned a score of 5. Table 5-2 summarizes the 
scores given to the Geneva Lakes acquisition based on the Kurt Lewin‘s model of change 
management. 
Table 5-2: Scoring Geneva Lakes case based on the Kurt Lewin's Model 
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5.1.2  Analysis based on the ADKAR Model 
 In this section, the ADKAR model is used to assess the effectiveness of change 
management in the Geneva Lakes acquisition case. The ADKAR model is focused on the people 
and believes that change is only possible if people can fully transition through five stages of 
Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability and Reinforcement. In this section, each step is explored 
and a score is assigned. 
 Awareness was raised through a consistent campaign of communication. Every employee 
knew that the current owners wished to sell the business and move on. They also knew that 
VersaCold had a vision to expand in the United State and grow further. The reason for acquisition 
was clear for all staff. This resulted in a very high awareness among the employees of both 
Geneva Lakes and VersaCold. For this reason, a score of 5 is assigned to the Awareness stage.   
 Desire was created through establishing trust among staff. The VersaCold‘s CEO and 
Vice President made repeated visits to the site in casual settings, spoke with staff and openly 
communicated with them. As a result, VersaCold gained the trust of the staff and was viewed as a 
‗good new owner‘. Employees were engaged in the process and participated in the transition. 
Everyone knew that there is not much change required on their part. Although this step was done 
relatively well, it did not create a major motivation for Geneva Lakes employees. VersaCold‘s 
attempts, at best, calmed down the employees that there would be no change, but did not provide 
any immediate incentive or opportunity for advancement. From the perspective of the employees, 
it was basically business as usual just with a new owner. For this reason, a score of 4 is assigned 
to the ‗Desire‘ stage. 
 Knowledge already existed. Since there was no change to systems, business processes 
and human resources, employees did not need to learn anything new.  All the previous processes 
were left unchanged. Also, because VersaCold had a decentralized model of operation, it did not 
force any new way of doing business on the local management. The general manager was given 
the autonomy to run the business with his knowledge and experience. This stage, therefore, did 
not require much attempt from VersaCold.  Nevertheless, because employees had the knowledge 
needed to do their job, a score of 5 is assigned to this stage. 
 The ability of the employees to carry their responsibilities was already proven. Since 
there was no change to the business practices and no new knowledge, there was little to be done 
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in transforming the knowledge ‗theory‘ to ‗practice‘. The VersaCold‘s CEO and Vice President 
did support the local manager and provided coaching and feedback. The feedback was generally 
positive as the local manager‘s performance was satisfactory and Geneva Lakes was meeting the 
set goals. Therefore, a score of 5 is assigned to the Ability phase.  
 Reinforcement was given through a continuous cycle of coaching, and providing 
feedback. Geneva Lakes continued to deliver favorable results year after year. According to Bob 
Lewarne, VersaCold Senior VP of Operations, for three years after the acquisition Geneva Lakes 
consistently met their target for EBITA.  For this reason, a score of 5 is assigned to the 
‗Reinforcement‘ stage.  
 Table 5-3 summarizes the scores given to the Geneva Lakes acquisition based on the 
ADKAR model of change management. In summary, this case received high scores because the 
scope of change was minimized and also because the change, though limited, was managed very 
well. The strength of VersaCold‘s best practice communication methods was a major contributor 
to the success of various stages of change management.  
Table 5-3: Scoring Geneva Lakes case based on the ADKARModel 
 
5.1.3  Analysis based on the ExperiencePoint’s Model 
 In this section, the ExperiencePoint‘s seven step model to change management is used to 
analyze the quality of decision making and change management in the case of Geneva Lakes 
acquisition. As discussed in section 3.3.3, the model is divided into two categories. The first 
category focuses on aligning key stakeholders for the decision making process and includes three 
stages of ‗Understand‘, ‗Enlist‘ and ‗Envisage‘. The second category focuses on executing 
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change across the organization and involves four steps of ‗Motivate‘, ‗Communicate‘, ‗Act‘, and 
‗Consolidate‘. In this section, each step is analyzed and a score is assigned. 
 Understand – This stage focuses on understanding the need for change through regular 
environmental scanning and organizational assessments. VersaCold‘s CEO and senior executives 
were veterans in the PRW industry with many years of experience. Additionally, they were well 
connected in the industry and aware of the trends and new developments. This deep 
understanding of the external environment and internal capabilities resulted in a corporate 
strategy for growth through acquisition.  The decision to acquire Geneva Lakes, therefore, was 
aligned with the corporate strategy and a direct result of clear understanding of the reasons for 
change. Once Geneva Lakes was identified as a possible target for acquisition, a detailed and 
thorough investigation was done to assess the suitability of the acquisition that took roughly nine 
months. Throughout the due diligence process, financial, operational, management, employee 
relations and environmental aspects of the Geneva Lakes and Wisconsin Logistics were carefully 
investigated. For the extensive amount of knowledge and understanding that resulted in the 
decision to acquire Geneva Lakes, a score of 5 is assigned to this step. 
 Enlist – This stage recommends assigning a team of powerful and influential stakeholders 
to develop a shared strategy and vision. At VersaCold this step was done; the core team included 
the CEO, CFO and Vice Presidents of the operations. Since all these people met the requirements 
of ‗powerful‘ and ‗influential‘ stakeholders in this model, it is assessed that this selection was 
suitable and in accordance with the model‘s recommendation. A score of 5 is assigned to this 
stage. 
 Envisage – This stage recommends building a vision for a desired future state. At 
VersaCold this vision was the corporate strategy of growth and expansion through acquisition. 
VersaCold‘s strategy was to expand its geographical presence across the border and penetrate the 
US market. Its acquisition of Geneva Lakes fit well with this strategy. Since a vision was created 
according to this model‘s recommendation, a score of 5 is assigned to this stage. 
 Motivate – This is the first stage in executing the change across the organization. This 
stage focuses on helping the stakeholders across the organization understand the reasons for 
change. As explained in prior sections, the reason for change was the Pokel family‘s wish to sell 
their business and VersaCold‘s vision to expand its geographical footprint into the United Sates. 
  
52 
The communication of the reasons for change was done very well and, thus, every employee 
understood the reasons for change. Although this prepared the employees to accept the change, it 
didn‘t provide them with clear incentives to embrace the change. At best, employees were as 
motivated and engaged as they were prior to the acquisition. Hence, a score of 4 is assigned to 
this stage.   
 Communicate – This stage of the execution focuses on communicating the vision to the 
affected stakeholders. This stage was done particularly well at VersaCold. A comprehensive 
communication campaign was developed to inform the employees of both firms of the vision. The 
campaign included different communication channels such as internal newsletters (Ice line and 
briefing), announcement, memos, and in-person meetings by VersaCold CEO and Vice President. 
A score of 5 is assigned to this stage. 
 Act – This stage is concerned with aligning the organization with its new vision and 
strategy. It involves the systems, business processes and organization structure. Due to the 
decentralized operation philosophy of VersaCold, the acquisition of Geneva Lakes did not 
introduce many changes to the organization.  Since the process was already aligned with the 
vision, there was no need to change. Therefore, a score of 5 is assigned to this stage. 
 Consolidate – The last stage of executing change across the organization involves 
continuous monitoring and measurement of the performance. This is intended to capture possible 
deviations from the vision and make adjustments such that the intended change becomes part of 
the organization culture. At VersaCold, this stage was done through establishing goals and 
objectives for Geneva Lakes general manager. These goals included operational and financial 
performance targets.  Performance was continuously monitored and feedback was given to 
Geneva Lakes general manager. For three years following the acquisition, these goals were 
consistently met. Therefore, a score of 5 is assigned to this stage.  
 Table 5-4 provides a summary of the scores given to the Geneva Lakes acquisition case 
study based on the ExperiencePoint‘s 7-step model of change management. 
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Table 5-4: Scoring Geneva Lakes case based on the ExperiencePoint 7-step Model 
 
 
5.2 Case 2- P&O Cold Logistics (POCL) 
  Through the acquisition of POCL in 2005, VersaCold suddenly became very large.  An 
acquisition of this size would normally bring many changes to the organizations. However, in this 
case, the changes were limited to the corporate level. Operationally, the changes were minimized 
due to three factors. First, both POCL and VersaCold operated under decentralized management 
models in which entrepreneurial spirit was encouraged. Following the acquisition, VersaCold 
continued to allow POCL regional units and individual facilities maximum license to be creative 
and flexible in meeting the unique needs of their customers and employees.  Second, there was no 
overlap between the customers of VersaCold and POCL and, thus, there was no competitive 
conflict between the units. Third, there was no change to systems and processes of each company. 
At the corporate level, though, there were some changes to consolidate the functions and remove 
unnecessary reporting layers. VersaCold‘s head office in Vancouver became responsible for 
overall corporate governance including legal, investor relations, strategic direction and policy 
development. Subsequently, POCL‘s headquarters located in Sydney, Australia was closed three 
months after the acquisition. In the US, three members of the senior management team (CEO, 
President and CFO) were eliminated in the first two months. The regional vice presidents in US 
along with the heads of the businesses in Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina reported to 
VersaCold‘s chairman and CEO, Brent Sugden.  
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 In the next sections, the three frameworks introduced in section 3.3 are used to analyze 
the change management in the POCL acquisition.  First, Kurt Lewin‘s model is used. Then, the 
ADKAR model is utilized. Third, the ExperiencePoint‘s seven step model is applied to the case 
study. 
5.2.1  Analysis based on Kurt Lewin’s Model 
 Using the Kurt Lewin‘s model, the three stages of unfreeze, change and freeze are 
explored. For the unfreeze stage, the driving forces for the acquisition are reviewed; P&O had 
decided to concentrate exclusively on its core container port business and hence was divesting its 
non-core operations. POCL was considered as a non-core business and as such was put up for 
sale. VersaCold, on the other hand, had a strategy of growth through acquisition and had a strong 
interest in expanding its operation in the US. Therefore, the desires of the companies matched and 
resulted in a friendly acquisition. These desires and motivations were very well communicated to 
employees of both firms and acted as driving forces for the changes that followed.  The 
motivations were communicated to staff through announcements, news letters, etc. In addition, 
VersaCold‘s CEO made a personal visit to all 49 POCL sites and talked to the general managers 
and staff directly. For these reasons, this stage is assigned a score of 5.  
 The second stage, change, came very quickly in this acquisition. One large component of 
the change was VersaCold‘s contractual obligation to cease the use and reference to the name 
P&O and POCL. This was a big project that involved changing business name/ trading name, 
licenses, signs and logos from buildings and vehicles, stationary, packing materials, business 
forms such as invoice, checques, etc. Ideally, with a change of this magnitude, all stakeholders 
should be involved to increase buy-in and cooperation. However, due to time constraints, this step 
was not fully followed. VersaCold‘s CEO had rolled out a 100-day plan to address all necessary 
changes. Although the changes were, for the most part, successfully completed according to the 
plan, there were some facilities that showed resistance during the process. The interviews 
revealed that people felt a top-down versus a collaborative approach was used. This approach was 
in conflict with the decentralized model that the staff was used to and VersaCold was promoting. 
Consequently, this contributed to a restraining force for change. Another change experienced in 
the acquisition of POCL, was the elimination of US senior management and the change in 
reporting relationships. This change was effectively implemented and was supported by 
appropriate communication. In Australia, New Zealand and Argentina, the heads of the business 
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were retained and their previous titles were unchanged. This was important and necessary due to 
the cultural characteristics of those countries. In those countries, specific titles had specific 
meanings conveying the level of the authority a person has. It was, therefore, wise not to make 
any changes to the titles. Overall, the change stage was done reasonably well. It would have 
helped to start the process with a more collaborative approach so facilities would be more willing 
to participate in the change. Nevertheless, since VersaCold was able to work with facility 
managers and implemented necessary changes within the required time frame, a rating of 4 is 
assigned to this stage. 
 As the changes were implemented, and reporting relationships established, the operation 
moved towards a more stable state and the focus became on running the business. Consistent with 
VersaCold‘s decentralized management style, the heads of the different business units were given 
the independence to manage their areas according to the unique needs of their regions. However, 
VersaCold‘s CEO continued to support the various business units and kept them on track through 
conducting regular performance reviews, quarterly meetings and frequent site visits. These 
activities, all, contributed to the freezing stage. This stage is assigned a score of 5. Table 5-5 
provides a summary of the scores given to the POCL case.  
 
Table 5-5: Scoring POCL case based on the Kurt Lewin's Model 
 
  
5.2.2   Analysis based on the ADKAR Model 
 In this section, the ADKAR model is used to assess the effectiveness of change 
management in the case of POCL acquisition.  The model, designed to transition people through 
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change, consists of five stages of Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability and Reinforcement. In 
this section, each stage is explored and a score is assigned.  
 Awareness was created through a series of communication channels. These included site 
visits, announcements, newsletters, and materials shared on VersaCold‘s intranet. The reasons for 
the acquisition were clearly communicated to all staff. Additionally, VersaCold developed and 
shared the company‘s ‗purpose‘ and ‗guiding principles‘ so that every employee becomes aware 
of what VersaCold is about. The purpose and guiding principles were distributed to all sites on 
posters and booklets.  The purpose was defined as: 
“Be the recognized leader in refrigerated logistics services to the advantage of our 
customers, employees, and investors. Be First in Cold”. 2 
 The accompanying communication emphasized awareness on three main components in 
the company‘s purpose: customers, employees, investors:  
“To achieve this we must: Provide our customers a competitive service package, 
Be a preferred place to work for employees, and generate earnings that attract 
investors and finance capital and demonstrate governance practices that inspire 
confidence from the public markers”. 3 
 The guiding principles, on the other hand, promoted awareness of company‘s culture and 
were categorized under seven principles:  
“We do what’s right!, We are never self-satisfied!, We are courageously open!, We 
act decisively!, We keep score! We look outside ourselves!, and We have fun!”. 4 
 All of these communication efforts resulted in high awareness among employees of both 
companies. For this reason, a score of 5 is assigned to the Awareness stage. 
 The next stage deals with creating desire to participate and support the change. This stage 
was not done particularly well. First, there was no clear incentive for POCL staff to support the 
integration of the two firms. Following the acquisition announcement and especially after the 
                                                     
2
 Source: Talking Point (Dec 15, 2005). Talking Point is an internal VersaCold news letter. 
3
 Source: Talking Point (Dec 15, 2005). Talking Point is an internal VersaCold news letter. 
4
 Source: Talking Point (Dec 15, 2005). Talking Point is an internal VersaCold news letter. 
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elimination of the three US senior managements, anxiety increased among staff. There was a 
concern as to what comes next. This anxiety was especially strong among corporate and back 
office staff. Without a definitive assurance and incentive, employees were not motivated to 
support the change. The second aspect that impacted the ―desire‖ stage was the reporting 
relationship imposed on the middle and senior management of POCL. The new reporting 
structure, in most cases, required the POCL managers to report to their counterparts in VersaCold. 
For example, POCL‘s director of HR would report to VersaCold‘s director of HR.  From a 
psychological viewpoint, this reporting structure had a demotivating effect on managers because 
it effectively lowerd their rank in the management hierarchy. The third element that affected the 
‗desire‘ stage was the initial rush to change all signage and reference to the name P&O and 
POCL. Because of the time constraints, VersaCold used an authoritative approach to quickly 
implement the changes. Little time was spent on motivating the staff and building internal desire 
to support the required changes. According to the VersaCold‘s Senior VP of Operations, Bob 
Lewarne, some valuable talent was lost during the transition. For these reasons, a score of 2 is 
assigned to this stage. 
 The third step of the model focuses on providing the employees with the knowledge. In 
this case, the acquired company was in the same industry providing the same services as 
VersaCold. Hence, the employees already had the knowledge to perform their jobs. In addition, 
the systems and processes were left unchanged so employees did not require gaining new 
knowledge regarding the systems and processes. Because employees had the knowledge to 
perform their responsibilities, this stage is assigned a score of 5.   
 The fourth stage of the ADKAR model, ability, focuses on putting the knowledge into 
practice. As discussed in the previous section, there was no change to the systems and processes 
of the companies. Employees continued to have the same responsibilities providing the same 
services. Therefore, employees already had a good foundation of the ‗theory‘ knowledge and 
‗practical‘ experience. VersaCold supplemented this foundation with regular performance review 
sessions in which coaching and feedback was provided. Therefore, a score of 5 is assigned to this 
stage. 
 The final stage of the ADKAR model deals with reinforcement of the changes. This stage 
was done relatively well due to strong communication and feedback provided after the transition.  
Aside from the formal performance review and coaching done by senior management, HR also 
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played a key role in reinforcing the purpose and guiding principles among the staff. This was 
evident in documents that HR would send out. For example, the purpose and guiding principles 
were printed on the cover page of the benefit booklets. In addition, the recognition programs were 
linked to the guiding principles and were designed to reward employees who demonstrated such 
principles.  For these reasons a score of 5 is assigned to the reinforcement stage.  
Table 5-6 summarizes the scores given to the POCL case using the ADKAR model. 
Table 5-6: Scoring POCL case based on the ADKARModel 
 
5.2.3   Analysis based on the ExperiencePoint’s Model 
 In this section, the ExperiencePoint‘s seven step model is used to analyze the 
effectiveness of change management in the POCL case. The first three steps (Understand, Enlist, 
and Envisage) focus on aligning key stakeholders for decision making. The next four steps 
(Motivate, Communicate, Act, and Consolidate) focus on executing change across the 
organization. In this section, each step is evaluated and a score is assigned. 
 Understand – The focus of this step is on the understanding of why change is required 
through external and internal assessments. As previously discussed, VersaCold‘s CEO and senior 
executives had developed a corporate strategy of growth through acquisition. This was the result 
of extensive studies and understanding of the external environment as well as the internal 
capabilities. Therefore, the company was searching for quality acquisition targets that would align 
with its strategic directions. Being active and well-connected in the industry, VersaCold became 
aware that P&O is being acquired by Dubai Port and that its non-core business units would be 
acquisition targets. Through a vigorous and detailed due diligence process, VersaCold gained a 
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deep understanding of POCL business and its suitability for acquisition. Due to the high level of 
understanding that lead to the decision to acquire POCL, a score of 5 is assigned to this step. 
 Enlist – This step recommends the assignment of a team of powerful and influential 
stakeholders to devise a shared strategy and vision. This team consisted of VersaCold‘s CEO, 
CFO and Vice Presidents of operation. Since all these team members were powerful and 
influential, consistent with the model‘s recommendation, this stage is assigned a score of 5.  
 Envisage – This step recommends developing a desired vision. This was done at the 
executive level in strategic meetings and resulted in the creation of company‘s purpose statement 
―Be the recognized leader in refrigerated logistics services to the advantage of our customers, 
employees, and investors. Be First In Cold‖. This vision was accompanied by seven ‗guiding 
principles‘ that outlined the envisioned cultural characteristics of the company. This stage is 
assigned a score of 5.  
 Motivate – This is the first step of implementing change and it wasn‘t done particularly 
well in this case.  As explained previously, there was a high level of anxiety and uncertainty 
among POCL staff following the announcement of the acquisition. While VersaCold‘s senior 
management were given an incentive (in terms of increased compensation) for managing a larger 
group, there was no clear incentive for POCL staff to support the integration of the two 
companies. Furthermore, the reporting relationships established had a demotivating effect for 
POCL middle and senior management because in most cases they were asked to report to a 
counterpart rather than a more senior level. For these reasons, a score of 3 is assigned to this step.  
 Communicate – This step of the implementation process stresses the communication of 
the vision to the affected stakeholders. This step was done well through a consistent campaign 
that communicated the ‗purpose‘ and ‗guiding principles‘ to all employees. The campaign 
included several communication channels such as the announcement letter, intranet, posters, 
booklets, and internal newsletters (Iceline and Briefing). This stage is assigned a score of 5.  
 Act – This stage involves the actual change to align the organization with its new vision 
and strategy and usually includes adjusting systems and business processes. In this case, however, 
due to the decentralized model of operation there was no need to change the system and 
processes. The operation of the two companies was aligned with the goals and visions. The 
change was limited to two elements. The first element was the change in business name, logo and 
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signage for POCL facilities which was done successfully in the first 100 days after the 
acquisition. The second element was the elimination of three US senior management positions 
and the transfer of corporate functions from Sydney head office to Vancouver head office. These 
were also completed successfully in the first 100 days.  This step was done relatively well and, 
thus, a score of 5is assigned.  
 Consolidate – The final step of executing change across the organization focuses on 
reinforcing desired outcomes. This was done through performance monitoring (at a minimum on 
a quarterly basis) and providing feedback. The intent of the feedback was to recognize and reward 
desired outcomes. If desired outcomes were not achieved, the feedback provided guidance on 
how to achieve them.  Aside from consolidating desired outcomes in the operational and financial 
elements of the business units‘ performance, cultural elements were also reinforced through 
integrating ‗guiding principles‘ in different aspects of the operations. One example was the 
development of ‗Service Stars‘ recognition program in which employees who demonstrated 
guiding principles in action were nominated for the award. Because of the comprehensive and 
integrative approaches used to consolidate the change, this stage is assigned a score of 5. Table 
5-7 provides a summary of the scores given to the POCL case using the ExperiencePoint‘s seven 
step model of change management. 
Table 5-7: Scoring POCL case based on the ExperiencePoint 7-step Model 
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5.3 Comparison of Cases 
 In this section, the two cases presented in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and analyzed in 
sections 5.1 and 5.2 are compared. Comparisons are made for each of the three change 
management models. Under each model, the total scores given and any observed differences are 
explained. 
Comparisons based on Kurt Lewin’s model 
 Table 5-8 shows the scores given to both cases using Kurt Lewin‘s model. The Geneva 
Lakes case received a perfect score of 15 out of 15 while the POCL case received a near perfect 
score of 14 out of 15. As these scored suggest, both cases were managed well in absolute terms. 
  Some similar aspects exist in these two cases that contributed to the success of change 
management. First, communication was very strong in all stages of the change management. 
VersaCold made a conscious effort to develop proper communication channels and 
communication materials that kept the staff informed throughout the process. Second, the 
management philosophy and culture of both companies were similar. Both were operating under 
decentralized management models and had a culture of entrepreneurship.  
 The scores for the two cases only differ in the ‗change‘ stage. In the Geneva Lakes case, 
this stage was done perfectly. In POCL case, however, some aspects were not ideal as explained 
in section 5.2. A major difference observed in the ‗change‘ stage between the two cases was the 
manner in which change was implemented; In the case of Geneva Lakes a collaborative approach 
was used whereas in the POCL case a more authoritative approach was used. This was partly 
attributed to the time pressures on the organization due to contractual agreements. Nevertheless, 
the top-down tone resulted in some resistance among staff and their eagerness to support the 
change.   
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Table 5-8: Comparison of cases based on the Kurt Lewin's model 
 
Comparisons based on ADKAR model 
  Table 5-9 demonstrates the scores given to the two cases using the ADKAR model. The 
Geneva Lakes case received a score of 24 out of 25 and the POCL case received a score of 22 out 
of 25. Neither case received a perfect score, but the scores were still high and indicative of a solid 
change management.  
 It is interesting to note that all stages of the ADKAR model except ‗Desire‘ received 
perfect scores for both cases. This section first looks at the stages that did receive perfect scores 
(Awareness, Knowledge, Ability, and Reinforcement). Next, the ‗Desire‘ stage is addressed. 
 The perfect scores for Awareness, Knowledge, Ability and Reinforcement obviously 
demonstrate that VersaCold is strong in these stages but what is more interesting is the realization 
that these strengths (especially for Awareness and Reinforcement stages) stem from strong 
communication. Hence, the effect of Versacold‘s excellent communication is again noticeable in 
the ADKAR model. Furthermore, since the acquired companies were already operating in the 
same field, the staff had the knowledge and ability to perform their tasks. As such, these two 
stages were relatively easy.  
 Since neither case received a perfect score for the ‗Desire‘ stage, it can be inferred that, 
regardless of the case, VersaCold did not perform ideally in this stage.  In both cases, a clear 
incentive for the staff of the acquired companies was lacking. This was more noticeable in the 
case of POCL acquisition especially because of the established reporting relationships that 
effectively lowered the ranking of some of POCL‘s middle and senior managers. Creating desire 
is an area that VersaCold can improve for its future mergers and acquisitions.  
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Table 5-9: Comparison of cases based on the ADKAR model 
 
Comparisons based on the ExperiencePoint’s model 
 Scores given to the Geneva Lakes and the POCL case using the ExperiencePoint‘s model 
is shown in Table 5-10. The Geneva Lakes case received a score of 34 out of 35 while the POCL 
case obtained a score of 33 out of 35. These high scores again confirm that VersaCold did a good 
job of managing change for both cases. Also, similar to the other two models, they indicate that 
the Geneva lakes case was managed better than the POCL case.  The difference in the scores is 
attributed only to the ‗Motivate‘ stage. As discussed in the previous section, this is an area that 
VersaCold can improve. 
Table 5-10: Comparison of cases based on the ExperiencePoint's model 
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6. Recommendations for Managing Change in Future M&A 
 This paper analyzed VersaCold‘s acquisition of Geneva Lakes in 2003 and acquisition of 
POCL in 2005 using three frameworks for change management. Based on the scores these cases 
received, it is evident that both cases were managed relatively well. Nevertheless, there are areas 
that VersaCold can improve for its future mergers and acquisitions. The areas on which 
VersaCold received the lowest scores were creating the desire for change and motivating staff. 
Aside from change management challenges that these shortcomings created, the lack of a 
vigorous motivation and incentive program resulted in departure of some talented staff in the case 
of POCL acquisition. This section offers some recommendations on these areas for VersaCold to 
use in its future M&As. 
 Before giving recommendations on motivating and creating incentives for staff affected 
by M&A, it is important to stress that these measures should be taken very quickly, ideally before 
the M&A announcement is made. Kay and Shelton (2000, p.27) indicate that within five days of 
the M&A announcement key employees, across all levels of the organization, usually receive 
inquiries from competitors and recruiters who are rushing to recruit them.  Competitors and 
recruiters understand that employees face a high level of anxiety and uncertainty in the first few 
days after the announcement on ―whether they have a job or, if they do, where it will be located, 
where they fit into the new company's structure, how much pay they will receive, or how their 
performance will be measured.‖ Hence, they take advantage of this period as a prime time to 
attract talent. This can be a big threat to the organization and can significantly hamper the 
organization‘s ability to reach its desired M&A objectives.  Therefore, a timely approach to 
prevent talent leakage is absolutely critical. 
 The attempts to build incentive and motivation should ideally include all staff, but at a 
minimum it should include people in key positions. The process to identify key people should 
start well before the M&A is announced. A best practice method adopted from Galpin and 
Herndon (2007) recommends that a few of the most senior officers from both companies meet to 
develop a list of 50 to 100 employees who are vital to the new organization. It also recommends 
that a person be assigned with the task of retaining those employees; otherwise, this important 
task becomes overshadowed with the overwhelming tasks of integration.  
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 Creating desire for change and motivation can be done in several ways. First, a sense of 
urgency needs to be created. This can be done through demonstrating the competitive position of 
the firm and highlighting either the dangers of not changing or the opportunities that result from 
the change, or both.  
 Next, a variety of monetary and/or non-monetary motivation tools can be used.  Some 
examples of monetary motivation tools include retention bonus plans, profit sharing, synergy gain 
sharing, project completion bonus, etc. These bonus plans are typically tied to performance and 
become payable in a specified future date. They are designed to encourage staff retention and 
performance at least until the date the bonus becomes payable. Monetary incentives can be very 
effective, but they impose a cost on the organization. The benefits and costs of monetary 
incentive plans should be examined to determine if they are appropriate for the organization. 
 Non-monetary incentives can also be very powerful in retaining and motivating 
employees and can be applied to a larger number of employees.  One example is involving 
employees in the integration process. The high level integration process can be broken down to 
smaller pieces that pertain to operation units. Involving employees in integration processes, even 
small pieces, help them engage, feel connected, heard and still somehow in control.  Another 
example is recognizing employee accomplishments and praising them. Recognition can take 
many forms from praising on the spot to more formal approaches such as ‗employee of the 
month‘. Another effective non-monetary incentive is developing career paths for employees that 
show them a picture of their future with the company if they choose to stay and perform. Another 
non-monetary incentive is providing employees with more desirable titles. Job title is a delicate 
subject for employees because it directly taps to their self-esteem and feeling of pride.  Worman 
(2010) suggests assigning titles that people feel proud to share in social gatherings.  Another 
incentive could be offering employees more responsibilities and decision making authority. Some 
employees really appreciate being in charge of more areas and thrive in that situation. It is 
therefore beneficial to identify these staff and provide them with the opportunity. 
 Another area that needs improvement is the reporting structure for post M&A. In the case 
of the POCL acquisition, the new reporting structure, in many cases, required the POCL 
managers to report to their counterparts in VersaCold. This had a demotivating effect on the 
managers. To minimize this effect and to keep managers motivated, Pikula (1999, p.11) suggests 
mixing employees as much as possible at all organizational levels. She stresses that when 
  
66 
departments are combined, senior management should carefully design a reporting structure such 
that functional counterparts are not placed in positions of subordinate and supervisory 
relationship.  
 Change is a very complex process. As much as this study attempted to gather the 
pertinent facts in analyzing VersaCold‘s change management processes associated with historical 
M&As, obtaining certain information about the detailed dynamics of the process after the fact is a 
challenge. The lack of fresh, detailed information that could best be captured during the progress 
of an M&A poses challenges in analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of historical M&As. 
Nonetheless, it is hoped that the presented analysis of the two cases can help improve the change 
management processes associated with future mergers and acquisitions of VersaCold.    
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